From 7411ebe05198d5365557b6c982b76ceb9e843894 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Pennock Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 22:14:45 -0400 Subject: Default config: reject on too many bad RCPT An example exploit failed against my system, because I had this sanity guard in place; it's not a real security fix since a careful attacker could find enough valid recipients to hit that problem, but it highlights that this is a useful enough pattern that we should encourage its wider use. (cherry picked from commit 2a636a39fff29b7c3da1798767a510dfed982a62) (cherry picked from commit 346f96bad326893f9c1fa772a5b8ac35b1f8f7bd) --- doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'doc') diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog index c219275fc..d741e3532 100644 --- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog +++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog @@ -256,6 +256,8 @@ HS/01 Enforce absolute PID file path name. HS/02 Handle SIGINT as we handle SIGTERM: terminate the Exim process. +PP/01 Add a too-many-bad-recipients guard to the default config's RCPT ACL. + Exim version 4.94 ----------------- -- cgit v1.2.3