diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r-- | src/src/verify.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/src/src/verify.c b/src/src/verify.c index 1eff49f49..95876d1cd 100644 --- a/src/src/verify.c +++ b/src/src/verify.c @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ else case ccache_accept: HDEBUG(D_verify) debug_printf("callout cache: domain accepts random addresses\n"); + *failure_ptr = US"random"; dbfn_close(dbm_file); return TRUE; /* Default yield is OK */ @@ -802,6 +803,7 @@ tls_retry_connection: new_domain_record.random_result = ccache_accept; yield = OK; /* Only usable verify result we can return */ done = TRUE; + *failure_ptr = US"random"; goto no_conn; case FAIL: /* rejected: the preferred result */ new_domain_record.random_result = ccache_reject; @@ -1657,9 +1659,9 @@ else ko_prefix = cr = US""; if (parse_find_at(address) == NULL) { - if ((options & vopt_qualify) == 0) + if (!(options & vopt_qualify)) { - if (f != NULL) + if (f) respond_printf(f, "%sA domain is required for \"%s\"%s\n", ko_prefix, address, cr); *failure_ptr = US"qualify"; @@ -1677,7 +1679,7 @@ DEBUG(D_verify) /* Rewrite and report on it. Clear the domain and local part caches - these may have been set by domains and local part tests during an ACL. */ -if (global_rewrite_rules != NULL) +if (global_rewrite_rules) { uschar *old = address; address = rewrite_address(address, options & vopt_is_recipient, FALSE, @@ -1686,21 +1688,21 @@ if (global_rewrite_rules != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < (MAX_NAMED_LIST * 2)/32; i++) vaddr->localpart_cache[i] = 0; for (i = 0; i < (MAX_NAMED_LIST * 2)/32; i++) vaddr->domain_cache[i] = 0; - if (f != NULL && !expn) fprintf(f, "Address rewritten as: %s\n", address); + if (f && !expn) fprintf(f, "Address rewritten as: %s\n", address); } } /* If this is the real sender address, we must update sender_address at this point, because it may be referred to in the routers. */ -if ((options & (vopt_fake_sender|vopt_is_recipient)) == 0) +if (!(options & (vopt_fake_sender|vopt_is_recipient))) sender_address = address; /* If the address was rewritten to <> no verification can be done, and we have to return OK. This rewriting is permitted only for sender addresses; for other addresses, such rewriting fails. */ -if (address[0] == 0) return OK; +if (!address[0]) return OK; /* Flip the legacy TLS-related variables over to the outbound set in case they're used in the context of a transport used by verification. Reset them @@ -1752,7 +1754,7 @@ while (addr_new) if (testflag(addr, af_pfr)) { allok = FALSE; - if (f != NULL) + if (f) { BOOL allow; @@ -1763,8 +1765,8 @@ while (addr_new) } else { - allow = (addr->address[0] == '|')? - testflag(addr, af_allow_pipe) : testflag(addr, af_allow_file); + allow = addr->address[0] == '|' + ? testflag(addr, af_allow_pipe) : testflag(addr, af_allow_file); fprintf(f, "%s -> %s", addr->parent->address, addr->address); } |