diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/src/tls-openssl.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c index 93ee07967..8b70b13c5 100644 --- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c +++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c @@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ tls_ext_ctx_cb *client_static_cbinfo = NULL; tls_ext_ctx_cb *server_static_cbinfo = NULL; static int -setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional, BOOL client); +setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional, + int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) ); /* Callbacks */ #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_OPENSSL_TLSEXT @@ -307,6 +308,9 @@ else /*XXX JGH: this looks bogus - we set "verified" first time through, which will be for the root CS cert (calls work down the chain). Why should it not be on the last call, where we're setting peerdn? + +To test: set up a chain anchored by a good root-CA but with a bad server cert. +Does certificate_verified get set? */ if (!*calledp) tlsp->certificate_verified = TRUE; *calledp = TRUE; @@ -739,7 +743,7 @@ if (cbinfo->u_ocsp.server.file) } #endif -rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, FALSE); +rc = setup_certs(server_sni, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, verify_callback_server); if (rc != OK) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; /* do this after setup_certs, because this can require the certs for verifying @@ -1191,13 +1195,14 @@ Arguments: host NULL in a server; the remote host in a client optional TRUE if called from a server for a host in tls_try_verify_hosts; otherwise passed as FALSE - client TRUE if called for client startup, FALSE for server startup + cert_vfy_cb Callback function for certificate verification Returns: OK/DEFER/FAIL */ static int -setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional, BOOL client) +setup_certs(SSL_CTX *sctx, uschar *certs, uschar *crl, host_item *host, BOOL optional, + int (*cert_vfy_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) ) { uschar *expcerts, *expcrl; @@ -1296,7 +1301,7 @@ if (expcerts != NULL && *expcerts != '\0') SSL_CTX_set_verify(sctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (optional? 0 : SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT), - client ? verify_callback_client : verify_callback_server); + cert_vfy_cb); } return OK; @@ -1375,13 +1380,15 @@ server_verify_callback_called = FALSE; if (verify_check_host(&tls_verify_hosts) == OK) { - rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, FALSE, FALSE); + rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, + FALSE, verify_callback_server); if (rc != OK) return rc; server_verify_optional = FALSE; } else if (verify_check_host(&tls_try_verify_hosts) == OK) { - rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, TRUE, FALSE); + rc = setup_certs(server_ctx, tls_verify_certificates, tls_crl, NULL, + TRUE, verify_callback_server); if (rc != OK) return rc; server_verify_optional = TRUE; } @@ -1549,7 +1556,7 @@ if (expciphers != NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list", host, NULL); } -rc = setup_certs(client_ctx, verify_certs, crl, host, FALSE, TRUE); +rc = setup_certs(client_ctx, verify_certs, crl, host, FALSE, verify_callback_client); if (rc != OK) return rc; if ((client_ssl = SSL_new(client_ctx)) == NULL) return tls_error(US"SSL_new", host, NULL); |