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diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt b/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..60f402004 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/doc-txt/GnuTLS-FAQ.txt @@ -0,0 +1,368 @@ +Using Exim 4.80+ with GnuTLS +============================ + +(1) I'm having problems building with GnuTLS 1, why? +(2) What changed? Why? +(3) I'm seeing: + "(gnutls_handshake): A TLS packet with unexpected length was received" + Why? +(4) What's the deal with MD5? +(5) What happened to gnutls_require_kx / gnutls_require_mac / + gnutls_require_protocols? +(6) What's the deal with tls_dh_max_bits? What's DH? +(7) What's a Priority String? +(8) How do I use tls_require_ciphers? +(9) How do I test STARTTLS support? + + + +(1): I'm having problems building with GnuTLS 1, why? +----------------------------------------------------- + +GnuTLS's library interface has changed and Exim uses the more current +interface. Since GnuTLS is security critical code, you should probably update +to a supported release. + +If updating GnuTLS is not an option, then build Exim against OpenSSL instead. + +If neither is an option, then you might build Exim with the rule +"SUPPORT_TLS=yes" commented out in "Local/Makefile", so that your Exim build +no longer has TLS support. + +If you need to keep TLS support, and you can't use OpenSSL, then you'll have +to update the GnuTLS you have installed. Sorry. + +We've tested the build of Exim back as far as GnuTLS 2.8.x; most development +work is done with 2.12 and tested on 2.10 and 3.x. + +If you have to pick a version to upgrade to, use GnuTLS 3.x if available. The +GnuTLS developers took advantage of the version bump to add an error code +return value which makes debugging some problems a lot easier. + + + +(2): What changed? Why? +------------------------ + +The GnuTLS provider integration in Exim was overhauled, rewritten but with +some copy/paste, because building Exim against more current releases of GnuTLS +was issuing deprecation warnings from the compiler. + +When a library provider marks up the include files so that some function calls +will cause the compiler/linker to emit deprecation warnings, it's time to pay +serious attention. A future release might not work at all. Using the new +APIs may mean that Exim will *stop* working with older releases of GnuTLS. +The GnuTLS support in Exim was overhauled in Exim 4.80. In prior releases, +Exim hard-coded a lot of algorithms and constrained what could happen. In +Exim 4.79, we added to the hard-coded list just enough to let TLSv1.1 and +TLSv1.2 be negotiated, but not actually support the mandatory algorithms of +those protocol versions. When Exim's GnuTLS integration was originally +written, there was no other choice than to make Exim responsible for a lot of +this. In the meantime, GnuTLS has improved. + +With the rewrite, we started using the current API and leaving a lot more +responsibility for TLS decisions to the library. + +The GnuTLS developers added "priority strings" (see Q7), which provide an +interface exposed to the configuration file for a lot of the tuning. + +The GnuTLS policy is to no longer support MD5 in certificates. Exim had +previously been immune to this policy, but no longer. See Q4. + + + +(3): I'm seeing "A TLS packet with unexpected length was received". Why? +------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +The most likely reason is that the client dropped the connection during +handshake, because their library disliked some aspect of the negotiation. + +In GnuTLS 2, an EOF on the connection is reported with an error code for +packets being too large, and the above is the string returned by the library +for that error code. In GnuTLS 3, there's a specific error code for EOF and +the diagnostic will be less confusing. + +Most likely cause is an MD5 hash used in a certificate. See Q4 below. +Alternatively, the client dislikes the size of the Diffie-Hellman prime +offered by the server; if lowering the value of the "tls_dh_max_bits" Exim +option fixes the problem, this was the cause. See Q6. + + + +(4): What's the deal with MD5? +------------------------------ + +MD5 is a hash algorithm. Hash algorithms are used to reduce a lot of data +down to a fairly short value, which is supposed to be extremely hard to +manipulate to get a value of someone's choosing. Signatures, used to attest +to identity or integrity, rely upon this manipulation being effectively +impossible, because the signature is the result of math upon the hash result. +Without hash algorithms, signatures would be longer than the text being +signed. + +MD5 was once very popular. It still is far too popular. Real world attacks +have been proven possible against MD5. Including an attack against PKI +(Public Key Infrastructure) certificates used for SSL/TLS. In that attack, +the attackers got a certificate for one identity but we able to then public a +certificate with the same signature but a different identity. This undermines +the whole purpose of having certificates. + +So GnuTLS stopped trusting any certificate with an MD5-based hash used in it. +The world has been hurriedly moving away from MD5 in certificates for a while. +If you still have such a certificate, you should move too. + +If you paid someone for your certificate, they should be willing to reissue +the certificate with a different algorithm, for no extra money. If they try +to charge money to replace their defective product, buy from someone else +instead. Part of the reason for paying money on a recurring basis is to cover +the ongoing costs of proving a trust relationship, such as providing +revocation protocols. This is just another of those ongoing costs you have +already paid for. + + + +(5): ... gnutls_require_kx / gnutls_require_mac / gnutls_require_protocols? +--------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +These Exim options were used to provide fine-grained control over the TLS +negotiation performed by GnuTLS. They required explicit protocol knowledge +from Exim, which vastly limited what GnuTLS could do and involved the Exim +maintainers in decisions which aren't part of their professional areas of +expertise. The need for Exim to be able to do this went away when GnuTLS +introduced Priority Strings (see Q7). + +If you were using these options before, then you're already an expert user and +should be able to easily craft a priority string to accomplish your goals. +Set the Exim "tls_require_ciphers" value accordingly. There is a main section +option of this name, used for Exim receiving inbound connections, and an SMTP +driver transport option of this name, used for Exim establishing outbound +connections. + + + +(6): What's the deal with tls_dh_max_bits? What's DH? +------------------------------------------------------ + +DH, Diffie-Hellman (or Diffie-Hellman-Merkle, or something naming Williamson) +is the common name for a way for two parties to a communication stream to +exchange some private random data so that both end up with a shared secret +which no evesdropper can get. It does not provide for proof of the identity +of either party, so on its own is subject to man-in-the-middle attacks, but is +often combined with systems which do provide such proof, improving them by +separating the session key (the shared secret) from the long-term identity, +and so protecting past communications from a break of the long-term identity. + +To do this, the server sends to the client a very large prime number; this is +in the clear, an attacker can see it. This is not a problem; it's so not a +problem, that there are standard named primes which applications can use, and +which a future release of Exim will probably support. + +The size of the prime number affects how difficult it is to break apart the +shared secret and decrypt the data. As time passes, the size required to +provide protection against an adversary climbs: computers get more powerful, +mathematical advances are made, and so on. + +Estimates of the size needed are published as recommendations by various +groups; a good summary of sizes currently recommended, for various +cryptographic primitives, is available at: + + http://www.keylength.com/en/3/ + +The GnuTLS folks think the ECRYPT II advice is good. They know far more of +such matters than the Exim folks, we just say "er, what they said". + +One of the new pieces of the GnuTLS API is a means for an application to ask +it for guidance and advice on how large some numbers should be. This is not +entirely internal to GnuTLS since generating the numbers is slow, an +application might want to use a standard prime, etc. So, in an attempt to get +away from being involved in cryptographic policy, and to get rid of a +hard-coded "1024" in Exim's source-code, we switched to asking GnuTLS how many +bits should be in the prime number generated for use for Diffie-Hellman. To +give back to GnuTLS for use We can ask for various sizes, and did not expose +this to the administrator but instead just asked for "NORMAL" protection. +Literally: + + dh_bits = gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(GNUTLS_PK_DH, GNUTLS_SEC_PARAM_NORMAL); + +This API is only available as of GnuTLS 2.12. Prior to that release, we stuck +with the old value, for compatibility, so "1024" is still hard-coded. +Reviewing the page above, you'll see that this is described as "Short-term +protection against medium organizations, medium-term protection against small +organizations." + +So if you are using an old release of GnuTLS, you can either add to +Local/Makefile a different value of "EXIM_SERVER_DH_BITS_PRE2_12" or accept +that your protection might not be adequate to your needs. We advise updating +to a more current GnuTLS release and rebuilding Exim against that. + +Unfortunately, some TLS libraries have the client side bound how large a DH +prime they will accept from the server. The larger the number, the more +computation required to work with it and the slower that things get. So they +pick what they believe to be reasonable upper bounds, and then typically +forget about it for several years. + +Worse, in TLS the DH negotiation happens after a ciphersuite has been chosen, +so if the client dislikes the value then a different ciphersuite avoiding DH +can not be negotiated! The client typically drops the connection, resulting +in errors to the user and errors in the Exim logs. With GnuTLS 3, you'll see +the EOF (End-Of-File) error message in Exim's logs, reported as being part of +"gnutls_handshake", but with GnuTLS 2 you'll see a log message about a packet +with an unexpected size. Unless the client software is written intelligently +enough to be able to adapt and reconnect forbidding DH, the client will never +be able to negotiate TLS. + +This time around, we discovered that the NSS library used by various Mozilla +products, Chrome, etc, and most particularly by the Thunderbird mail client, +has the lowest cap. In fact, prior to recent updates, their upper limit was +lower than the value returned by GnuTLS for "NORMAL". The most recent NSS +library release raises this, but the most recent Thunderbird release still has +the old limit. + +So Exim had to get involved in cryptography policy decisions again. We added +the "tls_dh_max_bits" global option, to set a number used in both OpenSSL and +GnuTLS bindings for Exim. In GnuTLS, it clamps the value returned by +gnutls_sec_param_to_pk_bits(), so that if the returned value is larger than +tls_dh_max_bits then tls_dh_max_bits would be used instead. + +Our policy decision was to default the value of tls_dh_max_bits to the maximum +supported in the most recent Thunderbird release, and to make this an +administrator-available option so that administrators can choose to trade off +security versus compatibility by raising it. + +A future release of Exim may even let the administrator tell GnuTLS to ask for +more or less than "NORMAL". + +A TLS client does not get to choose the DH prime used, but can choose a +minimum acceptable value. For Exim, this is a compile-time constant called +"EXIM_CLIENT_DH_MIN_BITS" of 1024, which can be overruled in "Local/Makefile". + + + +(7): What's a Priority String? +------------------------------ + +A priority string is a way for a user of GnuTLS to tell GnuTLS how it should +make decisions about what to do in TLS; it includes which algorithms to make +available for various roles, what compatibility trade-offs to make, which +features to enable or disable. + +It is exposed to the Mail Administrator in Exim's configuration file as the +"tls_require_ciphers" option, which exists as a main section option for use in +Exim as a server, accepting connections, and as an option on Transports using +the SMTP driver, for use in Exim as a client. The main section option is +*not* the default for the transport option, they are entirely independent. +For both, the default value used by Exim is the string "NORMAL". (This is not +the same NORMAL as for DH prime bit size selection in Q6, but a different +NORMAL.) See Q8. + +The current documentation, for the most recent release of GnuTLS, is available +online at: + + http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/manual/html_node/Priority-Strings.html + +Beware that if you are not using the most recent GnuTLS release then this +documentation will be wrong for you! You should find the "info" documentation +which came with GnuTLS to review the available options. It's under "The TLS +Handshake Protocol". + +$ pinfo --node="Priority Strings" gnutls + +(This author is unable to persuade the "info" command-line tool to jump +straight to the required node, but "pinfo" works.) + +To trade off some security for more compatibility, you might set a value of +"NORMAL:%COMPAT". See the documentation for more, including lowering security +even further for more security, forcing clients to use the server's protocol +suite, and ways to force selection of particular algorithms. + + + +(8): How do I use tls_require_ciphers? +-------------------------------------- + +This is the name of two options in Exim. One is a main section option, used +by Exim as a server when a client initiates SSL/TLS negotiation, the other is +an option on transports which use "driver = smtp", used when Exim initiates +SSL/TLS as a client talking to a remote server. + +The option is expanded and so can take advantage of any variables which have +been set. This includes the IP address of the remote side, the port upon +which a connection was accepted (when a server), and more. Currently it does +not have access to $tls_sni, whether as a client or as a server. + +This example, for the main section's option, will let the library defaults be +permitted on the MX port, where there's probably no identity verification +anyway, and lowers security further by increasing compatibility; but this ups +the ante on the submission ports where the administrator might have some +influence on the choice of clients used: + +tls_require_ciphers = ${if =={$received_port}{25}\ + {NORMAL:%COMPAT}\ + {SECURE128}} + +Note that during Exim start-up, when this option is sanity-checked, there will +be no value of $received_port. In the above example, the checked value will +thus be "SECURE128". Be careful to ensure that it always expands safely. + + + +(9): How do I test STARTTLS support? +------------------------------------ + +The best command-line client for debugging specifically SSL/TLS which this +author has encountered is part of the GnuTLS suite, and is called +"gnutls-cli". It's best because it's the only interactive tool which lets the +user start TLS handshake exactly when they wish, so can choose to use the +STARTTLS command. + +$ gnutls-cli --starttls --crlf --port 587 mail.example.org + +After EHLO, to see the capabilities, enter STARTTLS, wait for the response, +then send EOF. Typically that's done by typing Ctrl-D at the start of a line. +The "gnutls-cli" tool will take over, set up TLS (or fail) and by the time it +returns to await more user input, you're using a secure connection and should +type your second EHLO. + +The "--x509cafile" option may be helpful for checking certificates and +"--priority" to pass a priority string to the client tool for configuring it. + +The --crlf is for strict protocol correctness, but Exim doesn't really need +it, so "gnutls-cli -s -p 587 mail.example.org" is shorter. + + +For debugging SMTP as a whole, we recommend swaks, "Swiss Army Knife SMTP", by +John Jetmore (one of the Exim Maintainers). This has some TLS tuning options; +it can be found at: + + http://www.jetmore.org/john/code/swaks/ + + +For OpenSSL, the "openssl s_client" command helps; you can either set up Exim +with a listening port which is SSL-on-connect or tell s_client to use +STARTTLS. + +For the former, use the "tls_on_connect_ports" option and the +"daemon_smtp_ports" option. Most clients for SSL-on-connect use the port +which was briefly registered with IANA for this purpose, 465. So you would +set something like: + + daemon_smtp_ports = 25 : 465 : 587 + tls_on_connect_ports = 465 + +To use s_client with STARTTLS support, use "-starttls smtp" on the +command-line. Beware that older versions of OpenSSL did not wait for the SMTP +banner before sending EHLO, which will fall afoul of the protocol +synchronisation checks in Exim (used to trip up pump-and-dump spammers); also +you will not get control of the session until TLS is established. That said, +this tool provides more tuning hooks for adjusting how TLS will be set up than +most. + +*BEWARE* that by default, s_client will take any line starting with a capital +letter "R" to be a request to initiate TLS renegotiation with the server and +the line will not be sent. This may trip up "RCPT TO:<someone@example.org>" +lines in SMTP. SMTP is not case-sensitive, so type "rcpt to" instead. +Alternatively, invoke s_client with the "-ign_eof" option to disable this +R-filtering and a few other features. + + +# END OF FAQ |