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diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/rfc6698-dane.txt b/doc/doc-txt/rfc6698-dane.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000..95e7cf4f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/doc-txt/rfc6698-dane.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2075 @@ + + + + + + +Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Hoffman +Request for Comments: 6698 VPN Consortium +Category: Standards Track J. Schlyter +ISSN: 2070-1721 Kirei AB + August 2012 + + + The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) + Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA + +Abstract + + Encrypted communication on the Internet often uses Transport Layer + Security (TLS), which depends on third parties to certify the keys + used. This document improves on that situation by enabling the + administrators of domain names to specify the keys used in that + domain's TLS servers. This requires matching improvements in TLS + client software, but no change in TLS server software. + +Status of This Memo + + This is an Internet Standards Track document. + + This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force + (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has + received public review and has been approved for publication by the + Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on + Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741. + + Information about the current status of this document, any errata, + and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at + http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction ....................................................3 + 1.1. Background and Motivation ..................................3 + 1.2. Securing the Association of a Domain Name with a + Server's Certificate .......................................4 + 1.3. Method for Securing Certificate Associations ...............5 + 1.4. Terminology ................................................6 + 2. The TLSA Resource Record ........................................7 + 2.1. TLSA RDATA Wire Format .....................................7 + 2.1.1. The Certificate Usage Field .........................7 + 2.1.2. The Selector Field ..................................8 + 2.1.3. The Matching Type Field .............................9 + 2.1.4. The Certificate Association Data Field ..............9 + 2.2. TLSA RR Presentation Format ................................9 + 2.3. TLSA RR Examples ..........................................10 + 3. Domain Names for TLSA Certificate Associations .................10 + 4. Use of TLSA Records in TLS .....................................11 + 4.1. Usable Certificate Associations ...........................11 + 5. TLSA and DANE Use Cases and Requirements .......................13 + 6. Mandatory-to-Implement Features ................................15 + 7. IANA Considerations ............................................15 + 7.1. TLSA RRtype ...............................................15 + 7.2. TLSA Certificate Usages ...................................15 + 7.3. TLSA Selectors ............................................16 + 7.4. TLSA Matching Types .......................................16 + 8. Security Considerations ........................................16 + 8.1. Comparing DANE to Public CAs ..............................18 + 8.1.1. Risk of Key Compromise .............................19 + 8.1.2. Impact of Key Compromise ...........................20 + 8.1.3. Detection of Key Compromise ........................20 + 8.1.4. Spoofing Hostnames .................................20 + 8.2. DNS Caching ...............................................21 + 8.3. External DNSSEC Validators ................................21 + 9. Acknowledgements ...............................................22 + 10. References ....................................................22 + 10.1. Normative References .....................................22 + 10.2. Informative References ...................................23 + Appendix A. Operational Considerations for Deploying TLSA + Records ...............................................25 + A.1. Creating TLSA Records ......................................25 + A.1.1. Ambiguities and Corner Cases When TLS Clients + Build Trust Chains .....................................26 + A.1.2. Choosing a Selector Type ...............................26 + A.2. Provisioning TLSA Records in DNS ...........................28 + A.2.1. Provisioning TLSA Records with Aliases .................28 + A.3. Securing the Last Hop ......................................30 + A.4. Handling Certificate Rollover ..............................31 + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + Appendix B. Pseudocode for Using TLSA .............................32 + B.1. Helper Functions ...........................................32 + B.2. Main TLSA Pseudocode .......................................33 + Appendix C. Examples ..............................................35 + +1. Introduction + +1.1. Background and Motivation + + Applications that communicate over the Internet often need to prevent + eavesdropping, tampering, or forgery of their communications. The + Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol provides this kind of + communications security over the Internet, using channel encryption. + + The security properties of encryption systems depend strongly on the + keys that they use. If secret keys are revealed, or if public keys + can be replaced by fake keys (that is, a key not corresponding to the + entity identified in the certificate), these systems provide little + or no security. + + TLS uses certificates to bind keys and names. A certificate combines + a published key with other information such as the name of the + service that uses the key, and this combination is digitally signed + by another key. Having a key in a certificate is only helpful if one + trusts the other key that signed the certificate. If that other key + was itself revealed or substituted, then its signature is worthless + in proving anything about the first key. + + On the Internet, this problem has been solved for years by entities + called "Certification Authorities" (CAs). CAs protect their secret + key vigorously, while supplying their public key to the software + vendors who build TLS clients. They then sign certificates, and + supply those to TLS servers. TLS client software uses a set of these + CA keys as "trust anchors" to validate the signatures on certificates + that the client receives from TLS servers. Client software typically + allows any CA to usefully sign any other certificate. + + The public CA model upon which TLS has depended is fundamentally + vulnerable because it allows any of these CAs to issue a certificate + for any domain name. A single trusted CA that betrays its trust, + either voluntarily or by providing less-than-vigorous protection for + its secrets and capabilities, can undermine the security offered by + any certificates employed with TLS. This problem arises because a + compromised CA can issue a replacement certificate that contains a + fake key. Recent experiences with compromises of CAs or their + trusted partners have led to very serious security problems, such as + the governments of multiple countries attempting to wiretap and/or + subvert major TLS-protected web sites trusted by millions of users. + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) provide a similar model that + involves trusted keys signing the information for untrusted keys. + However, DNSSEC provides three significant improvements. Keys are + tied to names in the Domain Name System (DNS), rather than to + arbitrary identifying strings; this is more convenient for Internet + protocols. Signed keys for any domain are accessible online through + a straightforward query using the standard DNSSEC protocol, so there + is no problem distributing the signed keys. Most significantly, the + keys associated with a domain name can only be signed by a key + associated with the parent of that domain name; for example, the keys + for "example.com" can only be signed by the keys for "com", and the + keys for "com" can only be signed by the DNS root. This prevents an + untrustworthy signer from compromising anyone's keys except those in + their own subdomains. Like TLS, DNSSEC relies on public keys that + come built into the DNSSEC client software, but these keys come only + from a single root domain rather than from a multiplicity of CAs. + + DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) offers the option + to use the DNSSEC infrastructure to store and sign keys and + certificates that are used by TLS. DANE is envisioned as a + preferable basis for binding public keys to DNS names, because the + entities that vouch for the binding of public key data to DNS names + are the same entities responsible for managing the DNS names in + question. While the resulting system still has residual security + vulnerabilities, it restricts the scope of assertions that can be + made by any entity, consistent with the naming scope imposed by the + DNS hierarchy. As a result, DANE embodies the security "principle of + least privilege" that is lacking in the current public CA model. + +1.2. Securing the Association of a Domain Name with a Server's + Certificate + + A TLS client begins a connection by exchanging messages with a TLS + server. For many application protocols, it looks up the server's + name using the DNS to get an Internet Protocol (IP) address + associated with the name. It then begins a connection to a + particular port at that address, and sends an initial message there. + However, the client does not yet know whether an adversary is + intercepting and/or altering its communication before it reaches the + TLS server. It does not even know whether the real TLS server + associated with that domain name has ever received its initial + messages. + + The first response from the server in TLS may contain a certificate. + In order for the TLS client to authenticate that it is talking to the + expected TLS server, the client must validate that this certificate + is associated with the domain name used by the client to get to the + server. Currently, the client must extract the domain name from the + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + certificate and must successfully validate the certificate, including + chaining to a trust anchor. + + There is a different way to authenticate the association of the + server's certificate with the intended domain name without trusting + an external CA. Given that the DNS administrator for a domain name + is authorized to give identifying information about the zone, it + makes sense to allow that administrator to also make an authoritative + binding between the domain name and a certificate that might be used + by a host at that domain name. The easiest way to do this is to use + the DNS, securing the binding with DNSSEC. + + There are many use cases for such functionality. [RFC6394] lists the + ones to which the DNS RRtype in this document apply. [RFC6394] also + lists many requirements, most of which this document is believed to + meet. Section 5 covers the applicability of this document to the use + cases in detail. The protocol in this document can generally be + referred to as the "DANE TLSA" protocol. ("TLSA" does not stand for + anything; it is just the name of the RRtype.) + + This document applies to both TLS [RFC5246] and Datagram TLS (DTLS) + [RFC6347]. In order to make the document more readable, it mostly + only talks about "TLS", but in all cases, it means "TLS or DTLS". + Although the references in this paragraph are to TLS and DTLS + version 1.2, the DANE TLSA protocol can also be used with earlier + versions of TLS and DTLS. + + This document only relates to securely associating certificates for + TLS and DTLS with host names; retrieving certificates from DNS for + other protocols is handled in other documents. For example, keys for + IPsec are covered in [RFC4025], and keys for Secure SHell (SSH) are + covered in [RFC4255]. + +1.3. Method for Securing Certificate Associations + + A certificate association is formed from a piece of information + identifying a certificate and the domain name where the server + application runs. The combination of a trust anchor and a domain + name can also be a certificate association. + + A DNS query can return multiple certificate associations, such as in + the case of a server that is changing from one certificate to another + (described in more detail in Appendix A.4). + + This document only applies to PKIX [RFC5280] certificates, not + certificates of other formats. + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + This document defines a secure method to associate the certificate + that is obtained from the TLS server with a domain name using DNS; + the DNS information needs to be protected by DNSSEC. Because the + certificate association was retrieved based on a DNS query, the + domain name in the query is by definition associated with the + certificate. Note that this document does not cover how to associate + certificates with domain names for application protocols that depend + on SRV, NAPTR, and similar DNS resource records. It is expected that + future documents will cover methods for making those associations, + and those documents may or may not need to update this one. + + DNSSEC, which is defined in [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035], uses + cryptographic keys and digital signatures to provide authentication + of DNS data. Information that is retrieved from the DNS and that is + validated using DNSSEC is thereby proved to be the authoritative + data. The DNSSEC signature needs to be validated on all responses + that use DNSSEC in order to assure the proof of origin of the data. + + This document does not specify how DNSSEC validation occurs because + there are many different proposals for how a client might get + validated DNSSEC results, such as from a DNSSEC-aware resolver that + is coded in the application, from a trusted DNSSEC resolver on the + machine on which the application is running, or from a trusted DNSSEC + resolver with which the application is communicating over an + authenticated and integrity-protected channel or network. This is + described in more detail in Section 7 of [RFC4033]. + + This document only relates to getting the DNS information for the + certificate association securely using DNSSEC; other secure DNS + mechanisms are out of scope. + +1.4. Terminology + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. + + This document also makes use of standard PKIX, DNSSEC, TLS, and DNS + terminology. See [RFC5280], [RFC4033], [RFC5246], and STD 13 + [RFC1034] [RFC1035], respectively, for these terms. In addition, + terms related to TLS-protected application services and DNS names are + taken from [RFC6125]. + + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +2. The TLSA Resource Record + + The TLSA DNS resource record (RR) is used to associate a TLS server + certificate or public key with the domain name where the record is + found, thus forming a "TLSA certificate association". The semantics + of how the TLSA RR is interpreted are given later in this document. + + The type value for the TLSA RR type is defined in Section 7.1. + + The TLSA RR is class independent. + + The TLSA RR has no special Time to Live (TTL) requirements. + +2.1. TLSA RDATA Wire Format + + The RDATA for a TLSA RR consists of a one-octet certificate usage + field, a one-octet selector field, a one-octet matching type field, + and the certificate association data field. + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Cert. Usage | Selector | Matching Type | / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / + / / + / Certificate Association Data / + / / + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +2.1.1. The Certificate Usage Field + + A one-octet value, called "certificate usage", specifies the provided + association that will be used to match the certificate presented in + the TLS handshake. This value is defined in a new IANA registry (see + Section 7.2) in order to make it easier to add additional certificate + usages in the future. The certificate usages defined in this + document are: + + 0 -- Certificate usage 0 is used to specify a CA certificate, or + the public key of such a certificate, that MUST be found in any of + the PKIX certification paths for the end entity certificate given + by the server in TLS. This certificate usage is sometimes + referred to as "CA constraint" because it limits which CA can be + used to issue certificates for a given service on a host. The + presented certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path + validation, and a CA certificate that matches the TLSA record MUST + be included as part of a valid certification path. Because this + certificate usage allows both trust anchors and CA certificates, + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + the certificate might or might not have the basicConstraints + extension present. + + 1 -- Certificate usage 1 is used to specify an end entity + certificate, or the public key of such a certificate, that MUST be + matched with the end entity certificate given by the server in + TLS. This certificate usage is sometimes referred to as "service + certificate constraint" because it limits which end entity + certificate can be used by a given service on a host. The target + certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path validation and MUST + match the TLSA record. + + 2 -- Certificate usage 2 is used to specify a certificate, or the + public key of such a certificate, that MUST be used as the trust + anchor when validating the end entity certificate given by the + server in TLS. This certificate usage is sometimes referred to as + "trust anchor assertion" and allows a domain name administrator to + specify a new trust anchor -- for example, if the domain issues + its own certificates under its own CA that is not expected to be + in the end users' collection of trust anchors. The target + certificate MUST pass PKIX certification path validation, with any + certificate matching the TLSA record considered to be a trust + anchor for this certification path validation. + + 3 -- Certificate usage 3 is used to specify a certificate, or the + public key of such a certificate, that MUST match the end entity + certificate given by the server in TLS. This certificate usage is + sometimes referred to as "domain-issued certificate" because it + allows for a domain name administrator to issue certificates for a + domain without involving a third-party CA. The target certificate + MUST match the TLSA record. The difference between certificate + usage 1 and certificate usage 3 is that certificate usage 1 + requires that the certificate pass PKIX validation, but PKIX + validation is not tested for certificate usage 3. + + The certificate usages defined in this document explicitly only apply + to PKIX-formatted certificates in DER encoding [X.690]. If TLS + allows other formats later, or if extensions to this RRtype are made + that accept other formats for certificates, those certificates will + need their own certificate usage values. + +2.1.2. The Selector Field + + A one-octet value, called "selector", specifies which part of the TLS + certificate presented by the server will be matched against the + association data. This value is defined in a new IANA registry (see + Section 7.3). The selectors defined in this document are: + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + 0 -- Full certificate: the Certificate binary structure as defined + in [RFC5280] + + 1 -- SubjectPublicKeyInfo: DER-encoded binary structure as defined + in [RFC5280] + + (Note that the use of "selector" in this document is completely + unrelated to the use of "selector" in DomainKeys Identified Mail + (DKIM) [RFC6376].) + +2.1.3. The Matching Type Field + + A one-octet value, called "matching type", specifies how the + certificate association is presented. This value is defined in a new + IANA registry (see Section 7.4). The types defined in this document + are: + + 0 -- Exact match on selected content + + 1 -- SHA-256 hash of selected content [RFC6234] + + 2 -- SHA-512 hash of selected content [RFC6234] + + If the TLSA record's matching type is a hash, having the record use + the same hash algorithm that was used in the signature in the + certificate (if possible) will assist clients that support a small + number of hash algorithms. + +2.1.4. The Certificate Association Data Field + + This field specifies the "certificate association data" to be + matched. These bytes are either raw data (that is, the full + certificate or its SubjectPublicKeyInfo, depending on the selector) + for matching type 0, or the hash of the raw data for matching types 1 + and 2. The data refers to the certificate in the association, not to + the TLS ASN.1 Certificate object. + +2.2. TLSA RR Presentation Format + + The presentation format of the RDATA portion (as defined in + [RFC1035]) is as follows: + + o The certificate usage field MUST be represented as an 8-bit + unsigned integer. + + o The selector field MUST be represented as an 8-bit unsigned + integer. + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + o The matching type field MUST be represented as an 8-bit unsigned + integer. + + o The certificate association data field MUST be represented as a + string of hexadecimal characters. Whitespace is allowed within + the string of hexadecimal characters, as described in [RFC1035]. + +2.3. TLSA RR Examples + + In the following examples, the domain name is formed using the rules + in Section 3. + + An example of a hashed (SHA-256) association of a PKIX CA + certificate: + + _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( + 0 0 1 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9 + 7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 ) + + An example of a hashed (SHA-512) subject public key association of a + PKIX end entity certificate: + + _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( + 1 1 2 92003ba34942dc74152e2f2c408d29ec + a5a520e7f2e06bb944f4dca346baf63c + 1b177615d466f6c4b71c216a50292bd5 + 8c9ebdd2f74e38fe51ffd48c43326cbc ) + + An example of a full certificate association of a PKIX end entity + certificate: + + _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( + 3 0 0 30820307308201efa003020102020... ) + +3. Domain Names for TLSA Certificate Associations + + Unless there is a protocol-specific specification that is different + than this one, TLSA resource records are stored at a prefixed DNS + domain name. The prefix is prepared in the following manner: + + 1. The decimal representation of the port number on which a TLS- + based service is assumed to exist is prepended with an underscore + character ("_") to become the left-most label in the prepared + domain name. This number has no leading zeros. + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + 2. The protocol name of the transport on which a TLS-based service + is assumed to exist is prepended with an underscore character + ("_") to become the second left-most label in the prepared domain + name. The transport names defined for this protocol are "tcp", + "udp", and "sctp". + + 3. The base domain name is appended to the result of step 2 to + complete the prepared domain name. The base domain name is the + fully qualified DNS domain name [RFC1035] of the TLS server, with + the additional restriction that every label MUST meet the rules + of [RFC0952]. The latter restriction means that, if the query is + for an internationalized domain name, it MUST use the A-label + form as defined in [RFC5890]. + + For example, to request a TLSA resource record for an HTTP server + running TLS on port 443 at "www.example.com", + "_443._tcp.www.example.com" is used in the request. To request a + TLSA resource record for an SMTP server running the STARTTLS protocol + on port 25 at "mail.example.com", "_25._tcp.mail.example.com" is + used. + +4. Use of TLSA Records in TLS + + Section 2.1 of this document defines the mandatory matching rules for + the data from the TLSA certificate associations and the certificates + received from the TLS server. + + The TLS session that is to be set up MUST be for the specific port + number and transport name that was given in the TLSA query. + + Some specifications for applications that run over TLS, such as + [RFC2818] for HTTP, require that the server's certificate have a + domain name that matches the host name expected by the client. Some + specifications, such as [RFC6125], detail how to match the identity + given in a PKIX certificate with those expected by the user. + + If a TLSA record has certificate usage 2, the corresponding TLS + server SHOULD send the certificate that is referenced just like it + currently sends intermediate certificates. + +4.1. Usable Certificate Associations + + An implementation of this protocol makes a DNS query for TLSA + records, validates these records using DNSSEC, and uses the resulting + TLSA records and validation status to modify its responses to the TLS + server. + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + Determining whether a TLSA RRSet can be used MUST be based on the + DNSSEC validation state (as defined in [RFC4033]). + + o A TLSA RRSet whose DNSSEC validation state is secure MUST be used + as a certificate association for TLS unless a local policy would + prohibit the use of the specific certificate association in the + secure TLSA RRSet. + + o If the DNSSEC validation state on the response to the request for + the TLSA RRSet is bogus, this MUST cause TLS not to be started or, + if the TLS negotiation is already in progress, MUST cause the + connection to be aborted. + + o A TLSA RRSet whose DNSSEC validation state is indeterminate or + insecure cannot be used for TLS and MUST be considered unusable. + + Clients that validate the DNSSEC signatures themselves MUST use + standard DNSSEC validation procedures. Clients that rely on another + entity to perform the DNSSEC signature validation MUST use a secure + mechanism between themselves and the validator. Examples of secure + transports to other hosts include TSIG [RFC2845], SIG(0) [RFC2931], + and IPsec [RFC6071]. Note that it is not sufficient to use secure + transport to a DNS resolver that does not do DNSSEC signature + validation. See Section 8.3 for more security considerations related + to external validators. + + If a certificate association contains a certificate usage, selector, + or matching type that is not understood by the TLS client, that + certificate association MUST be considered unusable. If the + comparison data for a certificate is malformed, the certificate + association MUST be considered unusable. + + If a certificate association contains a matching type or certificate + association data that uses a cryptographic algorithm that is + considered too weak for the TLS client's policy, the certificate + association MUST be considered unusable. + + If an application receives zero usable certificate associations from + a DNS request or from its cache, it processes TLS in the normal + fashion without any input from the TLSA records. If an application + receives one or more usable certificate associations, it attempts to + match each certificate association with the TLS server's end entity + certificate until a successful match is found. During the TLS + handshake, if none of the certificate associations matches the + certificate given by the TLS server, the TLS client MUST abort the + handshake. + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + An attacker who is able to divert a user to a server under his + control is also likely to be able to block DNS requests from the user + or DNS responses being sent to the user. Thus, in order to achieve + any security benefit from certificate usage 0 or 1, an application + that sends a request for TLSA records needs to get either a valid + signed response containing TLSA records or verification that the + domain is insecure or indeterminate. If a request for a TLSA record + does not meet one of those two criteria but the application continues + with the TLS handshake anyway, the application has gotten no benefit + from TLSA and SHOULD NOT make any internal or external indication + that TLSA was applied. If an application has a configuration setting + that has turned on TLSA use, or has any indication that TLSA is in + use (regardless of whether or not this is configurable), that + application either MUST NOT start a TLS connection or it MUST abort a + TLS handshake if both of the two criteria above are not met. + + The application can perform the TLSA lookup before initiating the TLS + handshake, or do it during the TLS handshake: the choice is up to the + client. + +5. TLSA and DANE Use Cases and Requirements + + The different types of certificate associations defined in TLSA are + matched with various sections of [RFC6394]. The use cases from + Section 3 of [RFC6394] are covered in this document as follows: + + 3.1 CA Constraints -- Implemented using certificate usage 0. + + 3.2 Certificate Constraints -- Implemented using certificate usage 1. + + 3.3 Trust Anchor Assertion and Domain-Issued Certificates -- + Implemented using certificate usages 2 and 3, respectively. + + The requirements from Section 4 of [RFC6394] are covered in this + document as follows: + + Multiple Ports -- The TLSA records for different application services + running on a single host can be distinguished through the service + name and port number prefixed to the host name (see Section 3). + + No Downgrade -- Section 4 specifies the conditions under which a + client can process and act upon TLSA records. Specifically, if + the DNSSEC status for the TLSA resource record set is determined + to be bogus, the TLS connection (if started) will fail. + + Encapsulation -- Encapsulation is covered in the TLSA response + semantics. + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + Predictability -- The appendices of this specification provide + operational considerations and implementation guidance in order to + enable application developers to form a consistent interpretation + of the recommended client behavior. + + Opportunistic Security -- If a client conformant to this + specification can reliably determine the presence of a TLSA + record, it will attempt to use this information. Conversely, if a + client can reliably determine the absence of any TLSA record, it + will fall back to processing TLS in the normal fashion. This is + discussed in Section 4. + + Combination -- Multiple TLSA records can be published for a given + host name, thus enabling the client to construct multiple TLSA + certificate associations that reflect different assertions. No + support is provided to combine two TLSA certificate associations + in a single operation. + + Roll-over -- TLSA records are processed in the normal manner within + the scope of the DNS protocol, including the TTL expiration of the + records. This ensures that clients will not latch onto assertions + made by expired TLSA records, and will be able to transition from + using one public key or certificate usage to another. + + Simple Key Management -- The SubjectPublicKeyInfo selector in the + TLSA record provides a mode that enables a domain holder to only + have to maintain a single long-lived public/private key pair + without the need to manage certificates. Appendix A outlines the + usefulness and the potential downsides to using this mode. + + Minimal Dependencies -- This specification relies on DNSSEC to + protect the origin authenticity and integrity of the TLSA resource + record set. Additionally, if DNSSEC validation is not performed + on the system that wishes to use TLSA certificate bindings, this + specification requires that the "last mile" be over a secure + transport. There are no other deployment dependencies for this + approach. + + Minimal Options -- The operating modes map precisely to the DANE use + cases and requirements. DNSSEC use is mandatory in that this + specification encourages applications to use only those TLSA + records that are shown to be validated. + + Wildcards -- Wildcards are covered in a limited manner in the TLSA + request syntax; see Appendix A. + + Redirection -- Redirection is covered in the TLSA request syntax; see + Appendix A. + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +6. Mandatory-to-Implement Features + + TLS clients conforming to this specification MUST be able to + correctly interpret TLSA records with certificate usages 0, 1, 2, + and 3. TLS clients conforming to this specification MUST be able to + compare a certificate association with a certificate from the TLS + handshake using selector types 0 and 1, and matching type 0 (no hash + used) and matching type 1 (SHA-256), and SHOULD be able to make such + comparisons with matching type 2 (SHA-512). + +7. IANA Considerations + + IANA has made the assignments in this section. + + In the following sections, "RFC Required" was chosen for TLSA + certificate usages and "Specification Required" for selectors and + matching types because of the amount of detail that is likely to be + needed for implementers to correctly implement new certificate usages + as compared to new selectors and matching types. + +7.1. TLSA RRtype + + This document uses a new DNS RR type, TLSA, whose value (52) was + allocated by IANA from the Resource Record (RR) TYPEs subregistry of + the Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters registry. + +7.2. TLSA Certificate Usages + + This document creates a new registry, "TLSA Certificate Usages". The + registry policy is "RFC Required". The initial entries in the + registry are: + + Value Short description Reference + ---------------------------------------------------------- + 0 CA constraint RFC 6698 + 1 Service certificate constraint RFC 6698 + 2 Trust anchor assertion RFC 6698 + 3 Domain-issued certificate RFC 6698 + 4-254 Unassigned + 255 Private use + + Applications to the registry can request specific values that have + yet to be assigned. + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 15] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +7.3. TLSA Selectors + + This document creates a new registry, "TLSA Selectors". The registry + policy is "Specification Required". The initial entries in the + registry are: + + Value Short description Reference + ---------------------------------------------------------- + 0 Full certificate RFC 6698 + 1 SubjectPublicKeyInfo RFC 6698 + 2-254 Unassigned + 255 Private use + + Applications to the registry can request specific values that have + yet to be assigned. + +7.4. TLSA Matching Types + + This document creates a new registry, "TLSA Matching Types". The + registry policy is "Specification Required". The initial entries in + the registry are: + + Value Short description Reference + ---------------------------------------------------------- + 0 No hash used RFC 6698 + 1 SHA-256 RFC 6234 + 2 SHA-512 RFC 6234 + 3-254 Unassigned + 255 Private use + + Applications to the registry can request specific values that have + yet to be assigned. + +8. Security Considerations + + The security of the DNS RRtype described in this document relies on + the security of DNSSEC to verify that the TLSA record has not been + altered. + + A rogue DNS administrator who changes the A, AAAA, and/or TLSA + records for a domain name can cause the client to go to an + unauthorized server that will appear authorized, unless the client + performs PKIX certification path validation and rejects the + certificate. That administrator could probably get a certificate + issued by some CA anyway, so this is not an additional threat. + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 16] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + If the authentication mechanism for adding or changing TLSA data in a + zone is weaker than the authentication mechanism for changing the A + and/or AAAA records, a man-in-the-middle who can redirect traffic to + his site may be able to impersonate the attacked host in TLS if he + can use the weaker authentication mechanism. A better design for + authenticating DNS would be to have the same level of authentication + used for all DNS additions and changes for a particular domain name. + + Secure Socket Layer (SSL) proxies can sometimes act as a man-in-the- + middle for TLS clients. In these scenarios, the clients add a new + trust anchor whose private key is kept on the SSL proxy; the proxy + intercepts TLS requests, creates a new TLS session with the intended + host, and sets up a TLS session with the client using a certificate + that chains to the trust anchor installed in the client by the proxy. + In such environments, using TLSA records will prevent the SSL proxy + from functioning as expected because the TLS client will get a + certificate association from the DNS that will not match the + certificate that the SSL proxy uses with the client. The client, + seeing the proxy's new certificate for the supposed destination, will + not set up a TLS session. + + Client treatment of any information included in the trust anchor is a + matter of local policy. This specification does not mandate that + such information be inspected or validated by the server's domain + name administrator. + + If a server's certificate is revoked, or if an intermediate CA in a + chain between the server and a trust anchor has its certificate + revoked, a TLSA record with a certificate usage of 2 that matches the + revoked certificate would in essence override the revocation because + the client would treat that revoked certificate as a trust anchor and + thus not check its revocation status. Because of this, domain + administrators need to be responsible for being sure that the keys or + certificates used in TLSA records with a certificate usage of 2 are + in fact able to be used as reliable trust anchors. + + Certificates that are delivered in TLSA with certificate usage 2 + fundamentally change the way the TLS server's end entity certificate + is evaluated. For example, the server's certificate might chain to + an existing CA through an intermediate CA that has certain policy + restrictions, and the certificate would not pass those restrictions + and thus normally be rejected. That intermediate CA could issue + itself a new certificate without the policy restrictions and tell its + customers to use that certificate with certificate usage 2. This in + essence allows an intermediate CA to become a trust anchor for + certificates that the end user might have expected to chain to an + existing trust anchor. + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 17] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + If an administrator wishes to stop using a TLSA record, the + administrator can simply remove it from the DNS. Normal clients will + stop using the TLSA record after the TTL has expired. Replay attacks + against the TLSA record are not possible after the expiration date on + the RRsig of the TLSA record that was removed. + + Generators of TLSA records should be aware that the client's full + trust of a certificate association retrieved from a TLSA record may + be a matter of local policy. While such trust is limited to the + specific domain name, protocol, and port for which the TLSA query was + made, local policy may decline to accept the certificate (for reasons + such as weak cryptography), as is also the case with PKIX trust + anchors. + +8.1. Comparing DANE to Public CAs + + As stated above, the security of the DNS RRtype described in this + document relies on the security of DNSSEC to verify that the TLSA + record has not been altered. This section describes where the + security of public CAs and the security of TLSA are similar and + different. This section applies equally to other security-related + DNS RRtypes such as keys for IPsec and SSH. + + DNSSEC forms certificates (the binding of an identity to a key) by + combining a DNSKEY, DS, or DLV resource record with an associated + RRSIG record. These records then form a signing chain extending from + the client's trust anchors to the RR of interest. + + Although the DNSSEC protocol does not enforce it, DNSKEYs are often + marked with a SEP flag indicating whether the key is a Zone Signing + Key (ZSK) or a Key Signing Key (KSK). ZSKs protect records in the + zone (including DS and DLV records), and KSKs protect ZSK DNSKEY + records. This allows KSKs to be stored offline. + + The TLSA RRtype allows keys from the DNSSEC PKI hierarchy to + authenticate keys wrapped in PKIX certificates for a particular host + name, protocol, and port. + + With the exception of the DLV RRtype, all of these certificates + constrain the keys they identify to names that are within the zone + signing the certificate. In order for a domain's DLV resource + records to be honored, the domain must be configured as a DLV domain, + and the domain's DNSKEYs must be configured as trust anchors or be + authentic [RFC5074]. + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 18] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +8.1.1. Risk of Key Compromise + + The risk that a given certificate that has a valid signing chain is + fake is related to the number of keys that can contribute to the + validation of the certificate, the quality of protection each private + key receives, the value of each key to an attacker, and the value of + falsifying the certificate. + + DNSSEC allows any set of domains to be configured as trust anchors + and/or DLVs, but most clients are likely to use the root zone as + their only trust anchor. Also, because a given DNSKEY can only sign + resource records for that zone, the number of private keys capable of + compromising a given TLSA resource record is limited to the number of + zones between the TLSA resource record and the nearest trust anchor, + plus any configured DLV domains. Typically, this will be six keys, + half of which will be KSKs. + + PKIX only describes how to validate a certificate based on a client- + chosen set of trust anchors, but says nothing about how many trust + anchors to use or how they should be constrained. As currently + deployed, most PKIX clients use a large number of trust anchors + provided with the client or operating system software. These trust + anchors are selected carefully, but with a desire for broad + interoperability. The trust anchors and CA certificates for public + CAs rarely have name constraints applied. + + A combination of technical protections, process controls, and + personnel experience contribute to the quality of security that keys + receive. + + o The security surrounding DNSSEC DNSKEYs varies significantly. The + KSK/ZSK split allows the KSK to be stored offline and protected + more carefully than the ZSK, but not all domains do so. The + security applied to a zone's DNSKEYs should be proportional to the + value of the domain, but that is difficult to estimate. For + example, the root DNSKEY has protections and controls comparable + to or exceeding those of public CAs. On the other end of the + spectrum, small domains might provide no more protection to their + keys than they do to their other data. + + o The security surrounding public CAs also varies. However, due to + financial incentives and standards imposed by clients for + acceptance into their trust anchor stores, CAs generally employ + security experts and protect their keys carefully, though highly + public compromises have occurred. + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 19] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +8.1.2. Impact of Key Compromise + + The impact of a key compromise differs significantly between the two + models. + + o DNSKEYs are inherently limited in what they can sign, so a + compromise of the DNSKEY for "example.com" provides no avenue of + attack against "example.org". Even the impact of a compromise of + .com's DNSKEY, while considerable, would be limited to .com + domains. Only the compromise of the root DNSKEY would have the + equivalent impact of an unconstrained public CA. + + o Public CAs are not typically constrained in what names they can + sign, and therefore a compromise of even one CA allows the + attacker to generate a certificate for any name in the DNS. A + domain holder can get a certificate from any willing CA, or even + multiple CAs simultaneously, making it impossible for a client to + determine whether the certificate it is validating is legitimate + or fraudulent. + + Because a TLSA certificate association is constrained to its + associated name, protocol, and port, the PKIX certificate is + similarly constrained, even if its public CAs signing the certificate + (if any) are not. + +8.1.3. Detection of Key Compromise + + If a key is compromised, rapid and reliable detection is important in + order to limit the impact of the compromise. In this regard, neither + model prevents an attacker from near-invisibly attacking their + victim, provided that the necessary keys are compromised. + + If a public CA is compromised, only the victim will see the + fraudulent certificate, as there is typically no publicly accessible + directory of all the certificates issued by a CA that can be + inspected. DNS resource records are typically published publicly. + However, the attacker could also allow the uncompromised records to + be published to the Internet as usual but provide a compromised DNS + view to the victim to achieve the same effect. + +8.1.4. Spoofing Hostnames + + Some CAs implement technical controls to ensure that certificates are + not issued to domains with names similar to domains that are popular + and prone to attack. Of course, an attacker can attempt to + circumvent this restriction by finding a CA willing to issue the + certificate anyway. However, by using DNSSEC and TLSA, the attacker + can circumvent this check completely. + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 20] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +8.2. DNS Caching + + Implementations of this protocol rely heavily on the DNS, and are + thus prone to security attacks based on the deliberate + mis-association of TLSA records and DNS names. Implementations need + to be cautious in assuming the continuing validity of an association + between a TLSA record and a DNS name. + + In particular, implementations SHOULD rely on their DNS resolver for + confirmation of an association between a TLSA record and a DNS name, + rather than caching the result of previous domain name lookups. Many + platforms already can cache domain name lookups locally when + appropriate, and they SHOULD be configured to do so. It is proper + for these lookups to be cached, however, only when the TTL (Time To + Live) information reported by the DNS makes it likely that the cached + information will remain useful. + + If implementations cache the results of domain name lookups in order + to achieve a performance improvement, they MUST observe the TTL + information reported by DNS. Implementations that fail to follow + this rule could be spoofed or have access denied when a previously + accessed server's TLSA record changes, such as during a certificate + rollover. + +8.3. External DNSSEC Validators + + Due to a lack of DNSSEC support in the most commonly deployed stub + resolvers today, some ISPs have begun checking DNSSEC in the + recursive resolvers they provide to their customers, setting the + Authentic Data (AD) flag as appropriate. DNSSEC-aware clients could + use that data, ignoring the fact that the DNSSEC data has been + validated externally. Because there is typically no authentication + of the recursive resolver or integrity protection of the data and AD + flag between the client and the recursive resolver, this can be + trivially spoofed by an attacker. + + However, even with secure communications between a host and the + external validating resolver, there is a risk that the external + validator could become compromised. Nothing prevents a compromised + external DNSSEC validator from claiming that all the records it + provides are secure, even if the data is falsified, unless the client + checks the DNSSEC data itself (rendering the external validator + unnecessary). + + For this reason, DNSSEC validation is best performed on-host, even + when a secure path to an external validator is available. + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 21] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +9. Acknowledgements + + Many of the ideas in this document have been discussed over many + years. More recently, the ideas have been discussed by the authors + and others in a more focused fashion. In particular, some of the + ideas and words here originated with Paul Vixie, Dan Kaminsky, Jeff + Hodges, Phillip Hallam-Baker, Simon Josefsson, Warren Kumari, Adam + Langley, Ben Laurie, Ilari Liusvaara, Ondrej Mikle, Scott Schmit, + Ondrej Sury, Richard Barnes, Jim Schaad, Stephen Farrell, Suresh + Krishnaswamy, Peter Palfrader, Pieter Lexis, Wouter Wijngaards, John + Gilmore, and Murray Kucherawy. + + This document has also been greatly helped by many active + participants of the DANE Working Group. + +10. References + +10.1. Normative References + + [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", + STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. + + [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and + specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. + + [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", + RFC 4033, March 2005. + + [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", + RFC 4034, March 2005. + + [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. + Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security + Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. + + [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security + (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. + + [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., + Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key + Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List + (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 22] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and + Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity + within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 + (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer + Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. + + [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer + Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012. + +10.2. Informative References + + [RFC0952] Harrenstien, K., Stahl, M., and E. Feinler, "DoD Internet + host table specification", RFC 952, October 1985. + + [RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for + specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782, + February 2000. + + [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. + + [RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B. + Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS + (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000. + + [RFC2931] Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures + ( SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000. + + [RFC4025] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying + Material in DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005. + + [RFC4255] Schlyter, J. and W. Griffin, "Using DNS to Securely + Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints", RFC 4255, + January 2006. + + [RFC4641] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices", + RFC 4641, September 2006. + + [RFC5074] Weiler, S., "DNSSEC Lookaside Validation (DLV)", RFC 5074, + November 2007. + + [RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for + Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", + RFC 5890, August 2010. + + [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) + Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, + January 2011. + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 23] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + [RFC6071] Frankel, S. and S. Krishnan, "IP Security (IPsec) and + Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", RFC 6071, + February 2011. + + [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms + (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, May 2011. + + [RFC6376] Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., + "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", RFC 6376, + September 2011. + + [RFC6394] Barnes, R., "Use Cases and Requirements for DNS-Based + Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)", RFC 6394, + October 2011. + + [X.690] "Recommendation ITU-T X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, + Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: + Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical + Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules + (DER)", July 2002. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 24] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +Appendix A. Operational Considerations for Deploying TLSA Records + +A.1. Creating TLSA Records + + When creating TLSA records, care must be taken to avoid + misconfigurations. Section 4 of this document states that a TLSA + RRSet whose validation state is secure MUST be used. This means that + the existence of such a RRSet effectively disables other forms of + name and path validation. A misconfigured TLSA RRSet will + effectively disable access to the TLS server for all conforming + clients, and this document does not provide any means of making a + gradual transition to using TLSA. + + When creating TLSA records with certificate usage 0 (CA certificate) + or usage 2 (trust anchor), one needs to understand the implications + when choosing between selector type 0 (Full certificate) and 1 + (SubjectPublicKeyInfo). A careful choice is required because + different methods for building trust chains are used by different TLS + clients. The following outlines the cases that one ought to be aware + of and discusses the implications of the choice of selector type. + + Certificate usage 2 is not affected by the different types of chain + building when the end entity certificate is the same as the trust + anchor certificate. + +A.1.1. Ambiguities and Corner Cases When TLS Clients Build Trust Chains + + TLS clients can implement their own chain-building code rather than + rely on the chain presented by the TLS server. This means that, + except for the end entity certificate, any certificate presented in + the suggested chain might or might not be present in the final chain + built by the client. + + Certificates that the client can use to replace certificates from the + original chain include: + + o Client's trust anchors + + o Certificates cached locally + + o Certificates retrieved from a URI listed in an Authority + Information Access X.509v3 extension + + CAs frequently reissue certificates with different validity periods, + signature algorithms (such as a different hash algorithm in the + signature algorithm), CA key pairs (such as for a cross-certificate), + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 25] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + or PKIX extensions where the public key and subject remain the same. + These reissued certificates are the certificates that the TLS client + can use in place of an original certificate. + + Clients are known to exchange or remove certificates that could cause + TLSA certificate associations that rely on the full certificate to + fail. For example: + + o The client considers the signature algorithm of a certificate to + no longer be sufficiently secure. + + o The client might not have an associated root certificate in its + trust store and instead uses a cross-certificate with an identical + subject and public key. + +A.1.2. Choosing a Selector Type + + In this section, "false-negative failure" means that a client will + not accept the TLSA certificate association for a certificate + designated by the DNS administrator. Also, "false-positive + acceptance" means that the client accepts a TLSA association for a + certificate that is not designated by the DNS administrator. + +A.1.2.1. Selector Type 0 (Full Certificate) + + The "Full certificate" selector provides the most precise + specification of a TLSA certificate association, capturing all + fields of the PKIX certificate. For a DNS administrator, the best + course to avoid false-negative failures in the client when using this + selector is: + + 1. If a CA issued a replacement certificate, don't associate to CA + certificates that have a signature algorithm with a hash that is + considered weak by local policy. + + 2. Determine how common client applications process the TLSA + certificate association using a fresh client installation -- that + is, with the local certificate cache empty. + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 26] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +A.1.2.2. Selector Type 1 (SubjectPublicKeyInfo) + + A SubjectPublicKeyInfo selector gives greater flexibility in avoiding + some false-negative failures caused by trust-chain-building + algorithms used in clients. + + One specific use case ought to be noted: creating a TLSA certificate + association to CA certificate I1 that directly signed end entity + certificate S1 of the server. The case can be illustrated by the + following graph: + + +----+ +----+ + | I1 | | I2 | + +----+ +----+ + | | + v v + +----+ +----+ + | S1 | | S1 | + +----+ +----+ + Certificate chain sent by A different validation path + server in TLS handshake built by the TLS client + + I2 is a reissued version of CA certificate I1 (that is, it has a + different hash in its signature algorithm). + + In the above scenario, both certificates I1 and I2 that sign S1 need + to have identical SubjectPublicKeyInfo fields because the key used to + sign S1 is fixed. An association to SubjectPublicKeyInfo (selector + type 1) will always succeed in such a case, but an association with a + full certificate (selector type 0) might not work due to a false- + negative failure. + + The attack surface is a bit broader compared to the "Full + certificate" selector: the DNS administrator might unintentionally + specify an association that would lead to false-positive acceptance. + + o The administrator must know or trust that the CA does not engage + in bad practices, such as not sharing the key of I1 for unrelated + CA certificates (which would lead to trust-chain redirection). If + possible, the administrator ought to review all CA certificates + that have the same SubjectPublicKeyInfo field. + + o The administrator ought to understand whether some PKIX extension + may adversely affect security of the association. If possible, + administrators ought to review all CA certificates that share the + SubjectPublicKeyInfo. + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 27] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + o The administrator ought to understand that any CA could, in the + future, issue a certificate that contains the same + SubjectPublicKeyInfo. Therefore, new chains can crop up in the + future without any warning. + + Using the SubjectPublicKeyInfo selector for association with a + certificate in a chain above I1 needs to be decided on a case-by-case + basis: there are too many possibilities based on the issuing CA's + practices. Unless the full implications of such an association are + understood by the administrator, using selector type 0 is a better + option from a security perspective. + +A.2. Provisioning TLSA Records in DNS + +A.2.1. Provisioning TLSA Records with Aliases + + The TLSA resource record is not special in the DNS; it acts exactly + like any other RRtype where the queried name has one or more labels + prefixed to the base name, such as the SRV RRtype [RFC2782]. This + affects the way that the TLSA resource record is used when aliasing + in the DNS. + + Note that the IETF sometimes adds new types of aliasing in the DNS. + If that happens in the future, those aliases might affect TLSA + records, hopefully in a good way. + +A.2.1.1. Provisioning TLSA Records with CNAME Records + + Using CNAME to alias in DNS only aliases from the exact name given, + not any zones below the given name. For example, assume that a zone + file has only the following: + + sub1.example.com. IN CNAME sub2.example.com. + + In this case, a request for the A record at "bottom.sub1.example.com" + would not return any records because the CNAME given only aliases the + name given. Assume, instead, the zone file has the following: + + sub3.example.com. IN CNAME sub4.example.com. + bottom.sub3.example.com. IN CNAME bottom.sub4.example.com. + + In this case, a request for the A record at bottom.sub3.example.com + would in fact return whatever value for the A record exists at + bottom.sub4.example.com. + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 28] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + Application implementations and full-service resolvers request DNS + records using libraries that automatically follow CNAME (and DNAME) + aliasing. This allows hosts to put TLSA records in their own zones + or to use CNAME to do redirection. + + If the owner of the original domain wants a TLSA record for the same, + they simply enter it under the defined prefix: + + ; No TLSA record in target domain + ; + sub5.example.com. IN CNAME sub6.example.com. + _443._tcp.sub5.example.com. IN TLSA 1 1 1 308202c5308201ab... + sub6.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1 + sub6.example.com. IN AAAA 2001:db8::1 + + If the owner of the original domain wants to have the target domain + host the TLSA record, the original domain uses a CNAME record: + + ; TLSA record for original domain has CNAME to target domain + ; + sub5.example.com. IN CNAME sub6.example.com. + _443._tcp.sub5.example.com. IN CNAME _443._tcp.sub6.example.com. + sub6.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1 + sub6.example.com. IN AAAA 2001:db8::1 + _443._tcp.sub6.example.com. IN TLSA 1 1 1 536a570ac49d9ba4... + + Note that it is acceptable for both the original domain and the + target domain to have TLSA records, but the two records are + unrelated. Consider the following: + + ; TLSA record in both the original and target domain + ; + sub5.example.com. IN CNAME sub6.example.com. + _443._tcp.sub5.example.com. IN TLSA 1 1 1 308202c5308201ab... + sub6.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1 + sub6.example.com. IN AAAA 2001:db8::1 + _443._tcp.sub6.example.com. IN TLSA 1 1 1 ac49d9ba4570ac49... + + In this example, someone looking for the TLSA record for + sub5.example.com would always get the record whose value starts with + "308202c5308201ab"; the TLSA record whose value starts with + "ac49d9ba4570ac49" would only be sought by someone who is looking for + the TLSA record for sub6.example.com, and never for sub5.example.com. + Note that deploying different certificates for multiple services + located at a shared TLS listener often requires the use of TLS SNI + (Server Name Indication) [RFC6066]. + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 29] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + Note that these methods use the normal method for DNS aliasing using + CNAME: the DNS client requests the record type that they actually + want. + +A.2.1.2. Provisioning TLSA Records with DNAME Records + + Using DNAME records allows a zone owner to alias an entire subtree of + names below the name that has the DNAME. This allows the wholesale + aliasing of prefixed records such as those used by TLSA, SRV, and so + on without aliasing the name itself. However, because DNAME can only + be used for subtrees of a base name, it is rarely used to alias + individual hosts that might also be running TLS. + + ; TLSA record in target domain, visible in original domain via DNAME + ; + sub5.example.com. IN CNAME sub6.example.com. + _tcp.sub5.example.com. IN DNAME _tcp.sub6.example.com. + sub6.example.com. IN A 192.0.2.1 + sub6.example.com. IN AAAA 2001:db8::1 + _443._tcp.sub6.example.com. IN TLSA 1 1 1 536a570ac49d9ba4... + +A.2.1.3. Provisioning TLSA Records with Wildcards + + Wildcards are generally not terribly useful for RRtypes that require + prefixing because one can only wildcard at a layer below the host + name. For example, if one wants to have the same TLSA record for + every TCP port for www.example.com, the result might be: + + *._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA 1 1 1 5c1502a6549c423b... + + This is possibly useful in some scenarios where the same service is + offered on many ports or the same certificate and/or key is used for + all services on a host. Note that the domain being searched for is + not necessarily related to the domain name found in the certificate, + so a certificate with a wildcard in it is not searched for using a + wildcard in the search request. + +A.3. Securing the Last Hop + + As described in Section 4, an application processing TLSA records + must know the DNSSEC validity of those records. There are many ways + for the application to determine this securely, and this + specification does not mandate any single method. + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 30] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + Some common methods for an application to know the DNSSEC validity of + TLSA records include: + + o The application can have its own DNS resolver and DNSSEC + validation stack. + + o The application can communicate through a trusted channel (such as + requests to the operating system under which the application is + running) to a local DNS resolver that does DNSSEC validation. + + o The application can communicate through a secured channel (such as + requests running over TLS, IPsec, TSIG, or SIG(0)) to a non-local + DNS resolver that does DNSSEC validation. + + o The application can communicate through a secured channel (such as + requests running over TLS, IPsec, TSIG, or SIG(0)) to a non-local + DNS resolver that does not do DNSSEC validation, but gets + responses through a secured channel from a different DNS resolver + that does DNSSEC validation. + +A.4. Handling Certificate Rollover + + Certificate rollover is handled in much the same way as for rolling + DNSSEC zone signing keys using the pre-publish key rollover method + [RFC4641]. Suppose example.com has a single TLSA record for a TLS + service on TCP port 990: + + _990._tcp.example.com IN TLSA 1 1 1 1CFC98A706BCF3683015... + + To start the rollover process, obtain or generate the new certificate + or SubjectPublicKeyInfo to be used after the rollover and generate + the new TLSA record. Add that record alongside the old one: + + _990._tcp.example.com IN TLSA 1 1 1 1CFC98A706BCF3683015... + _990._tcp.example.com IN TLSA 1 1 1 62D5414CD1CC657E3D30... + + After the new records have propagated to the authoritative + nameservers and the TTL of the old record has expired, switch to the + new certificate on the TLS server. Once this has occurred, the old + TLSA record can be removed: + + _990._tcp.example.com IN TLSA 1 1 1 62D5414CD1CC657E3D30... + + This completes the certificate rollover. + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 31] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + +Appendix B. Pseudocode for Using TLSA + + This appendix describes, in pseudocode format, the interactions given + earlier in this specification. If the steps below disagree with the + text earlier in the document, the steps earlier in the document ought + to be considered correct and this text incorrect. + + Note that this pseudocode is more strict than the normative text. + For instance, it forces an order on the evaluation of criteria, which + is not mandatory from the normative text. + +B.1. Helper Functions + + // implement the function for exiting + function Finish (F) = { + if (F == ABORT_TLS) { + abort the TLS handshake or prevent TLS from starting + exit + } + + if (F == NO_TLSA) { + fall back to non-TLSA certificate validation + exit + } + + if (F == ACCEPT) { + accept the TLS connection + exit + } + + // unreachable + } + + // implement the selector function + function Select (S, X) = { + // Full certificate + if (S == 0) { + return X in DER encoding + } + + // SubjectPublicKeyInfo + if (S == 1) { + return X.SubjectPublicKeyInfo in DER encoding + } + + // unreachable + } + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 32] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + // implement the matching function + function Match (M, X, Y) { + // Exact match on selected content + if (M == 0) { + return (X == Y) + } + + // SHA-256 hash of selected content + if (M == 1) { + return (SHA-256(X) == Y) + } + + // SHA-512 hash of selected content + if (M == 2) { + return (SHA-512(X) == Y) + } + + // unreachable + } + +B.2. Main TLSA Pseudocode + + TLS connect using [transport] to [name] on [port] and receiving end + entity cert C for the TLS server: + + (TLSArecords, ValState) = DNSSECValidatedLookup( + domainname=_[port]._[transport].[name], RRtype=TLSA) + + // check for states that would change processing + if (ValState == BOGUS) { + Finish(ABORT_TLS) + } + if ((ValState == INDETERMINATE) or (ValState == INSECURE)) { + Finish(NO_TLSA) + } + // if here, ValState must be SECURE + + for each R in TLSArecords { + // unusable records include unknown certUsage, unknown + // selectorType, unknown matchingType, erroneous RDATA, and + // prohibited by local policy + if (R is unusable) { + remove R from TLSArecords + } + } + if (length(TLSArecords) == 0) { + Finish(NO_TLSA) + } + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 33] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + // A TLS client might have multiple trust anchors that it might use + // when validating the TLS server's end entity (EE) certificate. + // Also, there can be multiple PKIX certification paths for the + // certificates given by the server in TLS. Thus, there are + // possibly many chains that might need to be tested during + // PKIX path validation. + + for each R in TLSArecords { + + // pass PKIX certificate validation and chain through a CA cert + // that comes from TLSA + if (R.certUsage == 0) { + for each PKIX certification path H { + if (C passes PKIX certification path validation in H) { + for each D in H { + if ((D is a CA certificate) and + Match(R.matchingType, Select(R.selectorType, D), + R.cert)) { + Finish(ACCEPT) + } + } + } + } + } + + // pass PKIX certificate validation and match EE cert from TLSA + if (R.certUsage == 1) { + for each PKIX certification path H { + if ((C passes PKIX certificate validation in H) and + Match(R.matchingType, Select(R.selectorType, C), + R.cert)) { + Finish(ACCEPT) + } + } + } + + // pass PKIX certification validation using TLSA record as the + // trust anchor + if (R.certUsage == 2) { + // the following assert() is merely a formalization of the + // "trust anchor" condition for a certificate D matching R + assert(Match(R.matchingType, Select(R.selectorType, D), R.cert)) + + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 34] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + for each PKIX certification path H that has certificate D + matching R as the trust anchor { + if (C passes PKIX validation in H) { + Finish(ACCEPT); + } + } + } + + // match the TLSA record and the TLS certificate + if (R.certUsage == 3) { + if Match(R.matchingType, Select(R.selectorType, C), R.cert) + Finish(ACCEPT) + } + } + + } + + // if here, then none of the TLSA records ended in "Finish(ACCEPT)" + // so abort TLS + Finish(ABORT_TLS) + +Appendix C. Examples + + The following are examples of self-signed certificates that have been + generated with various selectors and matching types. They were + generated with one piece of software, and validated by an individual + using other tools. + + S = Selector + M = Matching Type + + S M Association Data + 0 0 30820454308202BC020900AB58D24E77AD2AF6300D06092A86 + 4886F70D0101050500306C310B3009060355040613024E4C31163014 + 0603550408130D4E6F6F72642D486F6C6C616E643112301006035504 + 071309416D7374657264616D310C300A060355040A13034F53333123 + 30210603550403131A64616E652E6B6965762E70726163746963756D + 2E6F73332E6E6C301E170D3132303131363136353730335A170D3232 + 303131333136353730335A306C310B3009060355040613024E4C3116 + 30140603550408130D4E6F6F72642D486F6C6C616E64311230100603 + 5504071309416D7374657264616D310C300A060355040A13034F5333 + 312330210603550403131A64616E652E6B6965762E70726163746963 + 756D2E6F73332E6E6C308201A2300D06092A864886F70D0101010500 + 0382018F003082018A0282018100E62C84A5AFE59F0A2A6B250DEE68 + 7AC8C5C604F57D26CEB2119140FFAC38C4B9CBBE8923082E7F81626B + 6AD5DEA0C8771C74E3CAA7F613054AEFA3673E48FFE47B3F7AF987DE + 281A68230B24B9DA1A98DCBE51195B60E42FD7517C328D983E26A827 + C877AB914EE4C1BFDEAD48BD25BE5F2C473BA9C1CBBDDDA0C374D0D5 + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 35] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August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offman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 36] + +RFC 6698 DNS-Based Authentication for TLS August 2012 + + + 1 1 8755CDAA8FE24EF16CC0F2C918063185E433FAAF1415664911 + D9E30A924138C4 + + 1 2 D43165B4CDF8F8660AECCCC5344D9D9AE45FFD7E6AAB7AB9EE + C169B58E11F227ED90C17330CC17B5CCEF0390066008C720CEC6AAE5 + 33A934B3A2D7E232C94AB4 + +Authors' Addresses + + Paul Hoffman + VPN Consortium + + EMail: paul.hoffman@vpnc.org + + + Jakob Schlyter + Kirei AB + + EMail: jakob@kirei.se + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Hoffman & Schlyter Standards Track [Page 37] + |