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-rw-r--r--doc/doc-misc/WishList7
-rw-r--r--doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog9
-rw-r--r--src/src/acl.c77
3 files changed, 65 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/doc/doc-misc/WishList b/doc/doc-misc/WishList
index a1c0243af..c42118bfd 100644
--- a/doc/doc-misc/WishList
+++ b/doc/doc-misc/WishList
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-misc/WishList,v 1.24 2005/03/07 09:36:43 ph10 Exp $
+$Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-misc/WishList,v 1.25 2005/03/15 15:36:41 ph10 Exp $
EXIM 4 WISH LIST
----------------
@@ -1884,5 +1884,8 @@ address. The wish is for options to control these numbers.
... and possibly "accept" or "deny" it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---- HWM 321 ------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+(322) 15-Mar-05 M Add a /defer_ok option to verify=reverse_host_lookup
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+--- HWM 322 ------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------- End of WishList ---------------------------------
diff --git a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
index fb88fa9e1..f4a898104 100644
--- a/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
+++ b/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-$Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog,v 1.91 2005/03/15 14:09:12 ph10 Exp $
+$Cambridge: exim/doc/doc-txt/ChangeLog,v 1.92 2005/03/15 15:36:41 ph10 Exp $
Change log file for Exim from version 4.21
-------------------------------------------
@@ -43,6 +43,13 @@ PH/04. Change 4.11/85 fixed an obscure bug concerned with addresses that are
PH/05. Renamed the macro SOCKLEN_T as EXIM_SOCKLEN_T because AIX uses SOCKLEN_T
in its include files, and this causes problems building Exim.
+PH/06. A number of "verify =" ACL conditions have no options (e.g. verify =
+ header_syntax) but Exim was just ignoring anything given after a slash.
+ In particular, this caused confusion with an attempt to use "verify =
+ reverse_host_lookup/defer_ok". An error is now given when options are
+ supplied for verify items that do not have them. (Maybe reverse_host_
+ lookup should have a defer_ok option, but that's a different point.)
+
A note about Exim versions 4.44 and 4.50
----------------------------------------
diff --git a/src/src/acl.c b/src/src/acl.c
index 1d0150d5b..8fb6a7eef 100644
--- a/src/src/acl.c
+++ b/src/src/acl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.24 2005/03/15 11:37:21 ph10 Exp $ */
+/* $Cambridge: exim/src/src/acl.c,v 1.25 2005/03/15 15:36:41 ph10 Exp $ */
/*************************************************
* Exim - an Internet mail transport agent *
@@ -1028,6 +1028,13 @@ address_item *sender_vaddr = NULL;
uschar *verify_sender_address = NULL;
uschar *pm_mailfrom = NULL;
uschar *se_mailfrom = NULL;
+
+/* Some of the verify items have slash-separated options; some do not. Diagnose
+an error if options are given for items that don't expect them. This code has
+now got very message. Refactoring to use a table would be a good idea one day.
+*/
+
+uschar *slash = Ustrchr(arg, '/');
uschar *list = arg;
uschar *ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size);
@@ -1037,6 +1044,7 @@ if (ss == NULL) goto BAD_VERIFY;
if (strcmpic(ss, US"reverse_host_lookup") == 0)
{
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
if (sender_host_address == NULL) return OK;
return acl_verify_reverse(user_msgptr, log_msgptr);
}
@@ -1047,6 +1055,7 @@ mandatory verification, the connection doesn't last this long.) */
if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
{
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
if (tls_certificate_verified) return OK;
*user_msgptr = US"no verified certificate";
return FAIL;
@@ -1054,42 +1063,51 @@ if (strcmpic(ss, US"certificate") == 0)
/* We can test the result of optional HELO verification */
-if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0) return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"helo") == 0)
+ {
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
+ return helo_verified? OK : FAIL;
+ }
-/* Handle header verification options - permitted only after DATA or a non-SMTP
-message. */
+/* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
+a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
+send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
+always). */
-if (strncmpic(ss, US"header_", 7) == 0)
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_syntax") == 0)
{
+ if (slash != NULL) goto NO_OPTIONS;
if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
{
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
"(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
return ERROR;
}
+ rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
+ if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
+ *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
+ return rc;
+ }
- /* Check that all relevant header lines have the correct syntax. If there is
- a syntax error, we return details of the error to the sender if configured to
- send out full details. (But a "message" setting on the ACL can override, as
- always). */
- if (strcmpic(ss+7, US"syntax") == 0)
- {
- int rc = verify_check_headers(log_msgptr);
- if (rc != OK && smtp_return_error_details && *log_msgptr != NULL)
- *user_msgptr = string_sprintf("Rejected after DATA: %s", *log_msgptr);
- return rc;
- }
+/* The remaining verification tests check recipient and sender addresses,
+either from the envelope or from the header. There are a number of
+slash-separated options that are common to all of them. */
- /* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
- header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
- sender and recipient. */
- else if (strcmpic(ss+7, US"sender") == 0) verify_header_sender = TRUE;
+/* Check that there is at least one verifiable sender address in the relevant
+header lines. This can be followed by callout and defer options, just like
+sender and recipient. */
- /* Unknown verify argument starting with "header_" */
-
- else goto BAD_VERIFY;
+if (strcmpic(ss, US"header_sender") == 0)
+ {
+ if (where != ACL_WHERE_DATA && where != ACL_WHERE_NOTSMTP)
+ {
+ *log_msgptr = string_sprintf("cannot check header contents in ACL for %s "
+ "(only possible in ACL for DATA)", acl_wherenames[where]);
+ return ERROR;
+ }
+ verify_header_sender = TRUE;
}
/* Otherwise, first item in verify argument must be "sender" or "recipient".
@@ -1127,7 +1145,8 @@ else
}
}
-/* Remaining items are optional */
+/* Remaining items are optional; they apply to sender and recipient
+verification, including "header sender" verification. */
while ((ss = string_nextinlist(&list, &sep, big_buffer, big_buffer_size))
!= NULL)
@@ -1501,9 +1520,17 @@ return rc;
BAD_VERIFY:
*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("expected \"sender[=address]\", \"recipient\", "
- "\"header_syntax\" or \"header_sender\" at start of ACL condition "
+ "\"helo\", \"header_syntax\", \"header_sender\" or "
+ "\"reverse_host_lookup\" at start of ACL condition "
"\"verify %s\"", arg);
return ERROR;
+
+/* Options supplied when not allowed come here */
+
+NO_OPTIONS:
+*log_msgptr = string_sprintf("unexpected '/' found in \"%s\" "
+ "(this verify item has no options)", arg);
+return ERROR;
}