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-rw-r--r--src/src/acl.c24
-rw-r--r--src/src/auths/dovecot.c448
-rw-r--r--src/src/daemon.c7
-rw-r--r--src/src/dcc.c14
-rw-r--r--src/src/drtables.c59
-rw-r--r--src/src/host.c2
-rw-r--r--src/src/rda.c2
-rw-r--r--src/src/sieve.c2
-rw-r--r--src/src/string.c4
-rw-r--r--src/src/tls-openssl.c29
10 files changed, 310 insertions, 281 deletions
diff --git a/src/src/acl.c b/src/src/acl.c
index f17e28488..236cfb7bd 100644
--- a/src/src/acl.c
+++ b/src/src/acl.c
@@ -1076,9 +1076,9 @@ while (*hstring == '\n') hstring++, hlen--;
/* An empty string does nothing; ensure exactly one final newline. */
if (hlen <= 0) return;
-if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n')
+if (hstring[--hlen] != '\n') /* no newline */
q = string_sprintf("%s\n", hstring);
-else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n')
+else if (hstring[hlen-1] == '\n') /* double newline */
{
uschar * s = string_copy(hstring);
while(s[--hlen] == '\n')
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ for (p = q; *p != 0; )
for (;;)
{
- q = Ustrchr(q, '\n');
+ q = Ustrchr(q, '\n'); /* we know there was a newline */
if (*(++q) != ' ' && *q != '\t') break;
}
@@ -2376,17 +2376,13 @@ rate measurement as opposed to rate limiting. */
sender_rate_limit = string_nextinlist(&arg, &sep, NULL, 0);
if (sender_rate_limit == NULL)
- {
- limit = -1.0;
- ss = NULL; /* compiler quietening */
- }
-else
- {
- limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
- if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
- else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
- else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
- }
+ return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr, "sender rate limit not set");
+
+limit = Ustrtod(sender_rate_limit, &ss);
+if (tolower(*ss) == 'k') { limit *= 1024.0; ss++; }
+else if (tolower(*ss) == 'm') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+else if (tolower(*ss) == 'g') { limit *= 1024.0*1024.0*1024.0; ss++; }
+
if (limit < 0.0 || *ss != '\0')
return ratelimit_error(log_msgptr,
"\"%s\" is not a positive number", sender_rate_limit);
diff --git a/src/src/auths/dovecot.c b/src/src/auths/dovecot.c
index c89411af8..9641beff4 100644
--- a/src/src/auths/dovecot.c
+++ b/src/src/auths/dovecot.c
@@ -228,244 +228,270 @@ return s;
* Server entry point *
*************************************************/
-int auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance *ablock, uschar *data)
+int
+auth_dovecot_server(auth_instance * ablock, uschar * data)
{
- auth_dovecot_options_block *ob =
- (auth_dovecot_options_block *)(ablock->options_block);
- struct sockaddr_un sa;
- uschar buffer[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXLINELEN];
- uschar *args[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXFIELDCOUNT];
- uschar *auth_command;
- uschar *auth_extra_data = US"";
- uschar *p;
- int nargs, tmp;
- int crequid = 1, cont = 1, fd, ret = DEFER;
- BOOL found = FALSE, have_mech_line = FALSE;
-
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot authentication\n");
-
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-
- /* This was the original code here: it is nonsense because strncpy()
- does not return an integer. I have converted this to use the function
- that formats and checks length. PH */
-
- /*
- if (strncpy(sa.sun_path, ob->server_socket, sizeof(sa.sun_path)) < 0) {
- */
-
- if (!string_format(US sa.sun_path, sizeof(sa.sun_path), "%s",
- ob->server_socket)) {
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket path too long";
- return DEFER;
- }
-
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket connection error";
-
- fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (fd < 0)
- return DEFER;
-
- if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0)
- goto out;
+auth_dovecot_options_block *ob =
+ (auth_dovecot_options_block *) ablock->options_block;
+struct sockaddr_un sa;
+uschar buffer[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXLINELEN];
+uschar *args[DOVECOT_AUTH_MAXFIELDCOUNT];
+uschar *auth_command;
+uschar *auth_extra_data = US"";
+uschar *p;
+int nargs, tmp;
+int crequid = 1, cont = 1, fd, ret = DEFER;
+BOOL found = FALSE, have_mech_line = FALSE;
+
+HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("dovecot authentication\n");
+
+if (!data)
+ {
+ ret = FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket protocol error";
+memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- socket_buffer_left = 0; /* Global, used to read more than a line but return by line */
- while (cont) {
- if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL)
- OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof");
- p = buffer + Ustrlen(buffer) - 1;
- if (*p != '\n') {
- OUT("authentication socket protocol line too long");
- }
- *p = '\0';
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
- nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
- /* HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); */
-
- /* Code below rewritten by Kirill Miazine (km@krot.org). Only check commands that
- Exim will need. Original code also failed if Dovecot server sent unknown
- command. E.g. COOKIE in version 1.1 of the protocol would cause troubles. */
- /* pdp: note that CUID is a per-connection identifier sent by the server,
- which increments at server discretion.
- By contrast, the "id" field of the protocol is a connection-specific request
- identifier, which needs to be unique per request from the client and is not
- connected to the CUID value, so we ignore CUID from server. It's purely for
- diagnostics. */
- if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"VERSION") == 0) {
- CHECK_COMMAND("VERSION", 2, 2);
- if (Uatoi(args[1]) != VERSION_MAJOR)
- OUT("authentication socket protocol version mismatch");
- } else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"MECH") == 0) {
- CHECK_COMMAND("MECH", 1, INT_MAX);
- have_mech_line = TRUE;
- if (strcmpic(US args[1], ablock->public_name) == 0)
- found = TRUE;
- } else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"SPID") == 0) {
- /* Unfortunately the auth protocol handshake wasn't designed well
- to differentiate between auth-client/userdb/master. auth-userdb
- and auth-master send VERSION + SPID lines only and nothing
- afterwards, while auth-client sends VERSION + MECH + SPID +
- CUID + more. The simplest way that we can determine if we've
- connected to the correct socket is to see if MECH line exists or
- not (alternatively we'd have to have a small timeout after SPID
- to see if CUID is sent or not). */
- if (!have_mech_line)
- OUT("authentication socket type mismatch (connected to auth-master instead of auth-client)");
- } else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"DONE") == 0) {
- CHECK_COMMAND("DONE", 0, 0);
- cont = 0;
- }
- }
+/* This was the original code here: it is nonsense because strncpy()
+does not return an integer. I have converted this to use the function
+that formats and checks length. PH */
- if (!found) {
- auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf("Dovecot did not advertise mechanism \"%s\" to us", ablock->public_name);
- goto out;
- }
+/*
+if (strncpy(sa.sun_path, ob->server_socket, sizeof(sa.sun_path)) < 0) {
+}
+*/
- /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is
- b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */
+if (!string_format(US sa.sun_path, sizeof(sa.sun_path), "%s",
+ ob->server_socket))
+ {
+ auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket path too long";
+ return DEFER;
+ }
- if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) {
- ret = FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket connection error";
- /* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP
- connection is local. */
+if ((fd = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+ return DEFER;
- if (tls_in.cipher != NULL)
- auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s",
- tls_in.certificate_verified? "valid-client-cert" : "",
- tls_in.certificate_verified? "\t" : "");
- else if (interface_address != NULL &&
- Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0)
- auth_extra_data = US"secured\t";
+if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket protocol error";
-/****************************************************************************
- The code below was the original code here. It didn't work. A reading of the
- file auth-protocol.txt.gz that came with Dovecot 1.0_beta8 indicated that
- this was not right. Maybe something changed. I changed it to move the
- service indication into the AUTH command, and it seems to be better. PH
-
- fprintf(f, "VERSION\t%d\t%d\r\nSERVICE\tSMTP\r\nCPID\t%d\r\n"
- "AUTH\t%d\t%s\trip=%s\tlip=%s\tresp=%s\r\n",
- VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), cuid,
- ablock->public_name, sender_host_address, interface_address,
- data ? (char *) data : "");
-
- Subsequently, the command was modified to add "secured" and "valid-client-
- cert" when relevant.
-****************************************************************************/
+socket_buffer_left = 0; /* Global, used to read more than a line but return by line */
+while (cont)
+ {
+ if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL)
+ OUT("authentication socket read error or premature eof");
+ p = buffer + Ustrlen(buffer) - 1;
+ if (*p != '\n')
+ OUT("authentication socket protocol line too long");
+
+ *p = '\0';
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
+
+ nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
+
+ /* HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_strcut(args, nargs, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0])); */
+
+ /* Code below rewritten by Kirill Miazine (km@krot.org). Only check commands that
+ Exim will need. Original code also failed if Dovecot server sent unknown
+ command. E.g. COOKIE in version 1.1 of the protocol would cause troubles. */
+ /* pdp: note that CUID is a per-connection identifier sent by the server,
+ which increments at server discretion.
+ By contrast, the "id" field of the protocol is a connection-specific request
+ identifier, which needs to be unique per request from the client and is not
+ connected to the CUID value, so we ignore CUID from server. It's purely for
+ diagnostics. */
+
+ if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"VERSION") == 0)
+ {
+ CHECK_COMMAND("VERSION", 2, 2);
+ if (Uatoi(args[1]) != VERSION_MAJOR)
+ OUT("authentication socket protocol version mismatch");
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"MECH") == 0)
+ {
+ CHECK_COMMAND("MECH", 1, INT_MAX);
+ have_mech_line = TRUE;
+ if (strcmpic(US args[1], ablock->public_name) == 0)
+ found = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"SPID") == 0)
+ {
+ /* Unfortunately the auth protocol handshake wasn't designed well
+ to differentiate between auth-client/userdb/master. auth-userdb
+ and auth-master send VERSION + SPID lines only and nothing
+ afterwards, while auth-client sends VERSION + MECH + SPID +
+ CUID + more. The simplest way that we can determine if we've
+ connected to the correct socket is to see if MECH line exists or
+ not (alternatively we'd have to have a small timeout after SPID
+ to see if CUID is sent or not). */
+
+ if (!have_mech_line)
+ OUT("authentication socket type mismatch"
+ " (connected to auth-master instead of auth-client)");
+ }
+ else if (Ustrcmp(args[0], US"DONE") == 0)
+ {
+ CHECK_COMMAND("DONE", 0, 0);
+ cont = 0;
+ }
+ }
- auth_command = string_sprintf("VERSION\t%d\t%d\nCPID\t%d\n"
- "AUTH\t%d\t%s\tservice=smtp\t%srip=%s\tlip=%s\tnologin\tresp=%s\n",
- VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), crequid,
- ablock->public_name, auth_extra_data, sender_host_address,
- interface_address, data ? (char *) data : "");
+if (!found)
+ {
+ auth_defer_msg = string_sprintf(
+ "Dovecot did not advertise mechanism \"%s\" to us", ablock->public_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (write(fd, auth_command, Ustrlen(auth_command)) < 0)
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("error sending auth_command: %s\n",
- strerror(errno));
+/* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is
+b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("sent: %s", auth_command);
+if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
- while (1) {
- uschar *temp;
- uschar *auth_id_pre = NULL;
- int i;
+/* Added by PH: extra fields when TLS is in use or if the TCP/IP
+connection is local. */
- if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL) {
- auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket read error or premature eof";
- goto out;
- }
+if (tls_in.cipher != NULL)
+ auth_extra_data = string_sprintf("secured\t%s%s",
+ tls_in.certificate_verified? "valid-client-cert" : "",
+ tls_in.certificate_verified? "\t" : "");
- buffer[Ustrlen(buffer) - 1] = 0;
- HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
- nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
+else if ( interface_address != NULL
+ && Ustrcmp(sender_host_address, interface_address) == 0)
+ auth_extra_data = US"secured\t";
- if (Uatoi(args[1]) != crequid)
- OUT("authentication socket connection id mismatch");
- switch (toupper(*args[0])) {
- case 'C':
- CHECK_COMMAND("CONT", 1, 2);
+/****************************************************************************
+The code below was the original code here. It didn't work. A reading of the
+file auth-protocol.txt.gz that came with Dovecot 1.0_beta8 indicated that
+this was not right. Maybe something changed. I changed it to move the
+service indication into the AUTH command, and it seems to be better. PH
+
+fprintf(f, "VERSION\t%d\t%d\r\nSERVICE\tSMTP\r\nCPID\t%d\r\n"
+ "AUTH\t%d\t%s\trip=%s\tlip=%s\tresp=%s\r\n",
+ VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), cuid,
+ ablock->public_name, sender_host_address, interface_address,
+ data ? (char *) data : "");
+
+Subsequently, the command was modified to add "secured" and "valid-client-
+cert" when relevant.
+****************************************************************************/
- tmp = auth_get_no64_data(&data, US args[2]);
- if (tmp != OK) {
- ret = tmp;
- goto out;
- }
+auth_command = string_sprintf("VERSION\t%d\t%d\nCPID\t%d\n"
+ "AUTH\t%d\t%s\tservice=smtp\t%srip=%s\tlip=%s\tnologin\tresp=%s\n",
+ VERSION_MAJOR, VERSION_MINOR, getpid(), crequid,
+ ablock->public_name, auth_extra_data, sender_host_address,
+ interface_address, data);
- /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is
- b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */
+if (write(fd, auth_command, Ustrlen(auth_command)) < 0)
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("error sending auth_command: %s\n",
+ strerror(errno));
- if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL) {
- ret = FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("sent: %s", auth_command);
- temp = string_sprintf("CONT\t%d\t%s\n", crequid, data);
- if (write(fd, temp, Ustrlen(temp)) < 0)
- OUT("authentication socket write error");
- break;
-
- case 'F':
- CHECK_COMMAND("FAIL", 1, -1);
-
- for (i=2; (i<nargs) && (auth_id_pre == NULL); i++)
- {
- if ( Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0 )
- {
- auth_id_pre = args[i]+5;
- expand_nstring[1] = auth_vars[0] =
- string_copy(auth_id_pre); /* PH */
- expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(auth_id_pre);
- expand_nmax = 1;
- }
- }
+while (1)
+ {
+ uschar *temp;
+ uschar *auth_id_pre = NULL;
+ int i;
- ret = FAIL;
- goto out;
-
- case 'O':
- CHECK_COMMAND("OK", 2, -1);
-
- /*
- * Search for the "user=$USER" string in the args array
- * and return the proper value.
- */
- for (i=2; (i<nargs) && (auth_id_pre == NULL); i++)
- {
- if ( Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0 )
- {
- auth_id_pre = args[i]+5;
- expand_nstring[1] = auth_vars[0] =
- string_copy(auth_id_pre); /* PH */
- expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(auth_id_pre);
- expand_nmax = 1;
- }
- }
+ if (dc_gets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fd) == NULL)
+ {
+ auth_defer_msg = US"authentication socket read error or premature eof";
+ goto out;
+ }
- if (auth_id_pre == NULL)
- OUT("authentication socket protocol error, username missing");
+ buffer[Ustrlen(buffer) - 1] = 0;
+ HDEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("received: %s\n", buffer);
+ nargs = strcut(buffer, args, sizeof(args) / sizeof(args[0]));
- ret = OK;
- /* fallthrough */
+ if (Uatoi(args[1]) != crequid)
+ OUT("authentication socket connection id mismatch");
- default:
- goto out;
- }
- }
+ switch (toupper(*args[0]))
+ {
+ case 'C':
+ CHECK_COMMAND("CONT", 1, 2);
+
+ if ((tmp = auth_get_no64_data(&data, US args[2])) != OK)
+ {
+ ret = tmp;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Added by PH: data must not contain tab (as it is
+ b64 it shouldn't, but check for safety). */
+
+ if (Ustrchr(data, '\t') != NULL)
+ {
+ ret = FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ temp = string_sprintf("CONT\t%d\t%s\n", crequid, data);
+ if (write(fd, temp, Ustrlen(temp)) < 0)
+ OUT("authentication socket write error");
+ break;
+
+ case 'F':
+ CHECK_COMMAND("FAIL", 1, -1);
+
+ for (i=2; (i<nargs) && (auth_id_pre == NULL); i++)
+ {
+ if ( Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0 )
+ {
+ auth_id_pre = args[i]+5;
+ expand_nstring[1] = auth_vars[0] = string_copy(auth_id_pre); /* PH */
+ expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(auth_id_pre);
+ expand_nmax = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = FAIL;
+ goto out;
+
+ case 'O':
+ CHECK_COMMAND("OK", 2, -1);
+
+ /* Search for the "user=$USER" string in the args array
+ and return the proper value. */
+
+ for (i=2; (i<nargs) && (auth_id_pre == NULL); i++)
+ {
+ if ( Ustrncmp(args[i], US"user=", 5) == 0 )
+ {
+ auth_id_pre = args[i]+5;
+ expand_nstring[1] = auth_vars[0] = string_copy(auth_id_pre); /* PH */
+ expand_nlength[1] = Ustrlen(auth_id_pre);
+ expand_nmax = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (auth_id_pre == NULL)
+ OUT("authentication socket protocol error, username missing");
+
+ ret = OK;
+ /* fallthrough */
+
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
out:
- /* close the socket used by dovecot */
- if (fd >= 0)
- close(fd);
+/* close the socket used by dovecot */
+if (fd >= 0)
+ close(fd);
- /* Expand server_condition as an authorization check */
- return (ret == OK)? auth_check_serv_cond(ablock) : ret;
+/* Expand server_condition as an authorization check */
+return ret == OK ? auth_check_serv_cond(ablock) : ret;
}
diff --git a/src/src/daemon.c b/src/src/daemon.c
index ac09e2a64..6c1919304 100644
--- a/src/src/daemon.c
+++ b/src/src/daemon.c
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ if (inetd_wait_mode)
int on = 1;
listen_socket_count = 1;
- listen_sockets = store_get(sizeof(int *));
+ listen_sockets = store_get(sizeof(int));
(void) close(3);
if (dup2(0, 3) == -1)
log_write(0, LOG_MAIN|LOG_PANIC_DIE,
@@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ if (daemon_listen && !inetd_wait_mode)
for (ipa = addresses; ipa != NULL; ipa = ipa->next)
listen_socket_count++;
- listen_sockets = store_get(sizeof(int *) * listen_socket_count);
+ listen_sockets = store_get(sizeof(int) * listen_socket_count);
} /* daemon_listen but not inetd_wait_mode */
@@ -1382,8 +1382,7 @@ if (daemon_listen && !inetd_wait_mode)
wildcard = ipa->address[0] == 0;
}
- listen_sockets[sk] = ip_socket(SOCK_STREAM, af);
- if (listen_sockets[sk] < 0)
+ if ((listen_sockets[sk] = ip_socket(SOCK_STREAM, af)) < 0)
{
if (check_special_case(0, addresses, ipa, FALSE))
{
diff --git a/src/src/dcc.c b/src/src/dcc.c
index c374cf91c..5d5c0b022 100644
--- a/src/src/dcc.c
+++ b/src/src/dcc.c
@@ -434,11 +434,11 @@ dcc_process(uschar **listptr)
}
}
else {
- /* We're on the first line but not on the first character,
- * there must be something wrong. */
- DEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("DCC: Line = %d but i = %d != 0 character is %c - This is wrong!\n", line, i, recvbuf[i]);
- log_write(0,LOG_MAIN,"Wrong header from DCC, output is %s\n", recvbuf);
+ /* We're on the first line but not on the first character,
+ * there must be something wrong. */
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("DCC: Line = %d but i = %d != 0"
+ " character is %c - This is wrong!\n", line, i, recvbuf[i]);
+ log_write(0,LOG_MAIN,"Wrong header from DCC, output is %s\n", recvbuf);
}
}
else if(line == 2) {
@@ -456,8 +456,8 @@ dcc_process(uschar **listptr)
k++;
}
else {
- DEBUG(D_acl)
- debug_printf("DCC: We got more output than we can store in the X-DCC header. Truncating at 120 characters.\n");
+ DEBUG(D_acl) debug_printf("DCC: We got more output than we can store"
+ " in the X-DCC header. Truncating at 120 characters.\n");
}
}
else {
diff --git a/src/src/drtables.c b/src/src/drtables.c
index d78b766a5..d427f3215 100644
--- a/src/src/drtables.c
+++ b/src/src/drtables.c
@@ -415,37 +415,42 @@ struct lookupmodulestr
static struct lookupmodulestr *lookupmodules = NULL;
-static void addlookupmodule(void *dl, struct lookup_module_info *info)
+static void
+addlookupmodule(void *dl, struct lookup_module_info *info)
{
- struct lookupmodulestr *p = store_malloc(sizeof(struct lookupmodulestr));
- p->dl = dl;
- p->info = info;
- p->next = lookupmodules;
- lookupmodules = p;
- lookup_list_count += info->lookupcount;
+struct lookupmodulestr *p = store_malloc(sizeof(struct lookupmodulestr));
+
+p->dl = dl;
+p->info = info;
+p->next = lookupmodules;
+lookupmodules = p;
+lookup_list_count += info->lookupcount;
}
/* only valid after lookup_list and lookup_list_count are assigned */
-static void add_lookup_to_list(lookup_info *info)
+static void
+add_lookup_to_list(lookup_info *info)
{
- /* need to add the lookup to lookup_list, sorted */
- int pos = 0;
-
- /* strategy is to go through the list until we find
- * either an empty spot or a name that is higher.
- * this can't fail because we have enough space. */
- while (lookup_list[pos]
- && (Ustrcmp(lookup_list[pos]->name, info->name) <= 0)) {
- pos++;
- }
- if (lookup_list[pos]) {
- /* need to insert it, so move all the other items up
- * (last slot is still empty, of course) */
- memmove(&lookup_list[pos+1],
- &lookup_list[pos],
- sizeof(lookup_info **) * (lookup_list_count-pos-1));
+/* need to add the lookup to lookup_list, sorted */
+int pos = 0;
+
+/* strategy is to go through the list until we find
+either an empty spot or a name that is higher.
+this can't fail because we have enough space. */
+
+while (lookup_list[pos] && (Ustrcmp(lookup_list[pos]->name, info->name) <= 0))
+ pos++;
+
+if (lookup_list[pos])
+ {
+ /* need to insert it, so move all the other items up
+ (last slot is still empty, of course) */
+
+ memmove(&lookup_list[pos+1],
+ &lookup_list[pos],
+ sizeof(lookup_info *) * (lookup_list_count-pos-1));
}
- lookup_list[pos] = info;
+lookup_list[pos] = info;
}
@@ -508,7 +513,9 @@ extern lookup_module_info testdb_lookup_module_info;
extern lookup_module_info whoson_lookup_module_info;
#endif
-void init_lookup_list(void)
+
+void
+init_lookup_list(void)
{
#ifdef LOOKUP_MODULE_DIR
DIR *dd;
diff --git a/src/src/host.c b/src/src/host.c
index b65168c68..8e71aec5f 100644
--- a/src/src/host.c
+++ b/src/src/host.c
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ else
count++;
yield = store_get(sizeof(struct hostent));
- alist = store_get((count + 1) * sizeof(char **));
+ alist = store_get((count + 1) * sizeof(char *));
adds = store_get(count *alen);
yield->h_name = CS name;
diff --git a/src/src/rda.c b/src/src/rda.c
index 2afd6dc8a..cf663a5ca 100644
--- a/src/src/rda.c
+++ b/src/src/rda.c
@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ if (yield == FF_DELIVERED || yield == FF_NOTDELIVERED ||
if (i > 0)
{
- addr->pipe_expandn = store_get((i+1) * sizeof(uschar **));
+ addr->pipe_expandn = store_get((i+1) * sizeof(uschar *));
addr->pipe_expandn[i] = NULL;
while (--i >= 0) addr->pipe_expandn[i] = expandn[i];
}
diff --git a/src/src/sieve.c b/src/src/sieve.c
index 8edb0b8b7..bda482fd1 100644
--- a/src/src/sieve.c
+++ b/src/src/sieve.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ for (pass=0; pass<=1; ++pass)
}
else
*new++='\n';
- line=0;
+ line=0; /*XXX jgh: questionabale indent; probable BUG */
++start;
}
else
diff --git a/src/src/string.c b/src/src/string.c
index d74787213..4ef6a3773 100644
--- a/src/src/string.c
+++ b/src/src/string.c
@@ -1087,8 +1087,8 @@ Returns: pointer to the start of the string, changed if copied for expansion.
because string_cat() is often called multiple times to build up a
string - there's no point adding the NUL till the end.
-coverity[+alloc]
*/
+/* coverity[+alloc] */
uschar *
string_cat(uschar *string, int *size, int *ptr, const uschar *s, int count)
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ common use is a null string and zero size and pointer, on first use for a
string being built. The "if" above then allocates, but Coverity assume that
the "if" might not happen and whines for a null-deref done by the memcpy(). */
-/* coverity[var_deref_op] */
+/* coverity[deref_parm_field_in_call] */
memcpy(string + p, s, count);
*ptr = p + count;
return string;
diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index ca687a632..85ba2e5bd 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -2362,27 +2362,28 @@ while (left > 0)
switch (error)
{
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
- ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
- return -1;
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), ssl_errstring);
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "TLS error (SSL_write): %s", ssl_errstring);
+ return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- left -= outbytes;
- buff += outbytes;
- break;
+ left -= outbytes;
+ buff += outbytes;
+ break;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
- return -1;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL channel closed on write");
+ return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
- sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
- strerror(errno));
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write: (from %s) syscall: %s",
+ sender_fullhost ? sender_fullhost : US"<unknown>",
+ strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
default:
- log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
- return -1;
+ log_write(0, LOG_MAIN, "SSL_write error %d", error);
+ return -1;
}
}
return len;
@@ -2819,6 +2820,7 @@ for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
keep_c = *end;
*end = '\0';
item_parsed = tls_openssl_one_option_parse(s, &item);
+ *end = keep_c;
if (!item_parsed)
{
DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("openssl option setting unrecognised: \"%s\"\n", s);
@@ -2830,7 +2832,6 @@ for (s=option_spec; *s != '\0'; /**/)
result |= item;
else
result &= ~item;
- *end = keep_c;
s = end;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-27 12:47:37 +0000