DANE: current src version

3 files changed, 563 insertions, 415 deletions

diff --git a/src/src/dane-openssl.c b/src/src/dane-openssl.c
index 6345b39ca..ed2b2f5af 100644
--- a/src/src/dane-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/dane-openssl.c
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+/*
+ *  Author: Viktor Dukhovni
+ *  License: THIS CODE IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
+ */
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
@@ -10,79 +14,82 @@
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000000fL
 # error "OpenSSL 1.0.0 or higher required"
 #else   /* remainder of file */
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+#define X509_up_ref(x) CRYPTO_add(&((x)->references), 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509)
+#endif
+
 #include "danessl.h"
 
-#define DANE_F_ADD_SKID                 100
-#define DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY         101
-#define DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN               102
-#define DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC               103
-#define DANE_F_MATCH                    104
-#define DANE_F_PUSH_EXT                 105
-#define DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR         106
-#define DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT        107
-#define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA        108
-#define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT            109
-#define DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT    110
-#define DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT              111
-#define DANE_F_WRAP_CERT                112
-
-#define DANE_R_BAD_CERT                 100
-#define DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY            101
-#define DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH          102
-#define DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST               103
-#define DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA            104
-#define DANE_R_BAD_PKEY                 105
-#define DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR             106
-#define DANE_R_BAD_USAGE                107
-#define DANE_R_DANE_INIT                108
-#define DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT             109
-#define DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT             110
-#define DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY               111
-#define DANE_R_SCTX_INIT                112
+#define DANESSL_F_ADD_SKID		100
+#define DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA		101
+#define DANESSL_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY	102
+#define DANESSL_F_CTX_INIT		103
+#define DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN		104
+#define DANESSL_F_INIT			105
+#define DANESSL_F_LIBRARY_INIT		106
+#define DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC		107
+#define DANESSL_F_MATCH			108
+#define DANESSL_F_PUSH_EXT		109
+#define DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR	110
+#define DANESSL_F_VERIFY_CERT		111
+#define DANESSL_F_WRAP_CERT		112
+
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT		100
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY		101
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH	102
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST		103
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA		104
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_PKEY		105
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_SELECTOR		106
+#define DANESSL_R_BAD_USAGE		107
+#define DANESSL_R_INIT			108
+#define DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT		109
+#define DANESSL_R_NOSIGN_KEY		110
+#define DANESSL_R_SCTX_INIT		111
+#define DANESSL_R_SUPPORT		112
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-# define DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER              0               /* FIRST! Value TBD */
-static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] =
-{
-    {DANE_F_PLACEHOLDER,                "DANE library"},        /* FIRST!!! */
-    {DANE_F_ADD_SKID,                   "add_skid"},
-    {DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY,           "check_end_entity"},
-    {DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN,                 "grow_chain"},
-    {DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC,                 "list_alloc"},
-    {DANE_F_MATCH,                      "match"},
-    {DANE_F_PUSH_EXT,                   "push_ext"},
-    {DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR,           "set_trust_anchor"},
-    {DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT,          "SSL_CTX_dane_init"},
-    {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA,          "SSL_dane_add_tlsa"},
-    {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT,              "SSL_dane_init"},
-    {DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT,      "SSL_dane_library_init"},
-    {DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT,                "verify_cert"},
-    {DANE_F_WRAP_CERT,                  "wrap_cert"},
-    {0,                                 NULL}
+#define	DANESSL_F_PLACEHOLDER		0		/* FIRST! Value TBD */
+static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = {
+    {DANESSL_F_PLACEHOLDER,		"DANE library"},	/* FIRST!!! */
+    {DANESSL_F_ADD_SKID,		"add_skid"},
+    {DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA,		"DANESSL_add_tlsa"},
+    {DANESSL_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY,	"check_end_entity"},
+    {DANESSL_F_CTX_INIT,		"DANESSL_CTX_init"},
+    {DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN,		"grow_chain"},
+    {DANESSL_F_INIT,			"DANESSL_init"},
+    {DANESSL_F_LIBRARY_INIT,		"DANESSL_library_init"},
+    {DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC,		"list_alloc"},
+    {DANESSL_F_MATCH,			"match"},
+    {DANESSL_F_PUSH_EXT,		"push_ext"},
+    {DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR,	"set_trust_anchor"},
+    {DANESSL_F_VERIFY_CERT,		"verify_cert"},
+    {DANESSL_F_WRAP_CERT,		"wrap_cert"},
+    {0,					NULL}
 };
-static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] =
-{
-    {DANE_R_BAD_CERT,           "Bad TLSA record certificate"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY,      "Bad TLSA record certificate public key"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH,    "Bad TLSA record digest length"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST,         "Bad TLSA record digest"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA,      "Bad TLSA record null data"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_PKEY,           "Bad TLSA record public key"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR,       "Bad TLSA record selector"},
-    {DANE_R_BAD_USAGE,          "Bad TLSA record usage"},
-    {DANE_R_DANE_INIT,          "SSL_dane_init() required"},
-    {DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT,       "DANE library features not supported"},
-    {DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT,       "SSL_dane_library_init() required"},
-    {DANE_R_SCTX_INIT,          "SSL_CTX_dane_init() required"},
-    {DANE_R_NOSIGN_KEY,         "Certificate usage 2 requires EC support"},
-    {0,                         NULL}
+static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = {
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT,	"Bad TLSA record certificate"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY,	"Bad TLSA record certificate public key"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH,	"Bad TLSA record digest length"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST,	"Bad TLSA record digest"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA,	"Bad TLSA record null data"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_PKEY,	"Bad TLSA record public key"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_SELECTOR,	"Bad TLSA record selector"},
+    {DANESSL_R_BAD_USAGE,	"Bad TLSA record usage"},
+    {DANESSL_R_INIT,		"DANESSL_init() required"},
+    {DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT,	"DANESSL_library_init() required"},
+    {DANESSL_R_NOSIGN_KEY,	"Certificate usage 2 requires EC support"},
+    {DANESSL_R_SCTX_INIT,	"DANESSL_CTX_init() required"},
+    {DANESSL_R_SUPPORT,		"DANE library features not supported"},
+    {0,				NULL}
 };
-#endif	/*OPENSSL_NO_ERR*/
+#endif
 
 #define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
 
@@ -166,15 +173,17 @@ typedef struct ssl_dane
     int            (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *);
     STACK_OF(X509) *roots;
     STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
-    const char     *thost;              /* TLSA base domain */
-    char           *mhost;              /* Matched, peer name */
+    X509           *match;		/* Matched cert */
+    const char     *thost;		/* TLSA base domain */
+    char	   *mhost;		/* Matched peer name */
     dane_pkey_list pkeys;
     dane_cert_list certs;
     dane_host_list hosts;
-    dane_selector_list selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST + 1];
+    dane_selector_list selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_LAST + 1];
     int            depth;
-    int            multi;               /* Multi-label wildcards? */
-    int            count;               /* Number of TLSA records */
+    int		   mdpth;		/* Depth of matched cert */
+    int		   multi;		/* Multi-label wildcards? */
+    int		   count;		/* Number of TLSA records */
 } ssl_dane;
 
 #ifndef X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
@@ -191,14 +200,14 @@ int matched;
  * pkey digest or a certificate digest.  We return MATCHED_PKEY or
  * MATCHED_CERT accordingly.
  */
-#define MATCHED_CERT (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT + 1)
-#define MATCHED_PKEY (SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI + 1)
+#define MATCHED_CERT (DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT + 1)
+#define MATCHED_PKEY (DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI + 1)
 
 /*
  * Loop over each selector, mtype, and associated data element looking
  * for a match.
  */
-for(matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next)
+for (matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next)
   {
   dane_mtype_list m;
   unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
@@ -211,21 +220,21 @@ for(matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next)
    */
   switch(slist->value->selector)
     {
-    case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT:
+    case DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT:
       len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL);
       buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
       if(buf) i2d_X509(cert, &buf2);
       break;
-    case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+    case DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI:
       len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
       buf2 = buf = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
       if(buf) i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2);
       break;
     }
 
-  if(!buf)
+  if (!buf)
     {
-    DANEerr(DANE_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    DANEerr(DANESSL_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     return 0;
     }
   OPENSSL_assert(buf2 - buf == len);
@@ -233,7 +242,7 @@ for(matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next)
   /*
    * Loop over each mtype and data element
    */
-  for(m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next)
+  for (m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next)
     {
     dane_data_list d;
     unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf;
@@ -243,15 +252,15 @@ for(matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next)
      * If it is a digest, compute the corresponding digest of the
      * DER data for comparison, otherwise, use the full object.
      */
-    if(m->value->md)
+    if (m->value->md)
       {
       cmpbuf = mdbuf;
-      if(!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0))
+      if (!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0))
 	  matched = -1;
       }
-    for(d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next)
-	if(  cmplen == d->value->datalen
-	  && memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0)
+    for (d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next)
+	if (  cmplen == d->value->datalen
+	   && memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0)
 	    matched = slist->value->selector + 1;
     }
 
@@ -264,18 +273,13 @@ return matched;
 static int
 push_ext(X509 *cert, X509_EXTENSION *ext)
 {
-X509_EXTENSIONS *exts;
-
-if(ext)
-  {
-  if(!(exts = cert->cert_info->extensions))
-    exts = cert->cert_info->extensions = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null();
-  if (exts && sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(exts, ext))
-    return 1;
-  X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
-  }
-DANEerr(DANE_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-return 0;
+    if (ext) {
+	if (X509_add_ext(cert, ext, -1))
+	    return 1;
+	X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    }
+    DANEerr(DANESSL_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return 0;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -293,19 +297,19 @@ set_serial(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509 *subject)
 int ret = 0;
 BIGNUM *bn;
 
-if(akid && akid->serial)
+if (akid && akid->serial)
   return (X509_set_serialNumber(cert, akid->serial));
 
 /*
  * Add one to subject's serial to avoid collisions between TA serial and
  * serial of signing root.
  */
-if(  (bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0
-  && BN_add_word(bn, 1)
-  && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
+if (  (bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0
+   && BN_add_word(bn, 1)
+   && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert)))
   ret = 1;
 
-if(bn)
+if (bn)
   BN_free(bn);
 return ret;
 }
@@ -325,16 +329,16 @@ int ret = 0;
  * exempt from any potential (off by default for now in OpenSSL)
  * self-signature checks!
  */
-id = (ASN1_STRING *) ((akid && akid->keyid) ? akid->keyid : 0);
-if(id && M_ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *M_ASN1_STRING_data(id) == c)
+id =  (akid && akid->keyid) ? akid->keyid : 0;
+if (id && ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *ASN1_STRING_data(id) == c)
   c = 1;
 
-if(  (akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0
-  && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0
-  && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1)
-  && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND))
+if (  (akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0
+   && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0
+   && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1)
+   && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND))
   ret = 1;
-if(akid)
+if (akid)
   AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid);
 return ret;
 }
@@ -344,7 +348,7 @@ add_skid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
 {
 int nid = NID_subject_key_identifier;
 
-if(!akid || !akid->keyid)
+if (!akid || !akid->keyid)
   return add_ext(0, cert, nid, "hash");
 return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0;
 }
@@ -352,16 +356,16 @@ return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0;
 static X509_NAME *
 akid_issuer_name(AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
 {
-if(akid && akid->issuer)
+if (akid && akid->issuer)
   {
   int     i;
   GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer;
 
-  for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i)
+  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i)
     {
     GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
 
-    if(gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
+    if (gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME)
       return (gn->d.dirn);
     }
   }
@@ -390,27 +394,27 @@ static ASN1_OBJECT *serverAuth = 0;
 #define UNTRUSTED 0
 #define TRUSTED 1
 
-if(  trusted && !serverAuth
-  && !(serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth)))
+if (  trusted && !serverAuth
+   && !(serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth)))
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return 0;
   }
-if(!*xs && !(*xs = sk_X509_new_null()))
+if (!*xs && !(*xs = sk_X509_new_null()))
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return 0;
   }
 
-if(cert)
+if (cert)
   {
-  if(trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth))
+  if (trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth))
     return 0;
   CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
   if (!sk_X509_push(*xs, cert))
     {
     X509_free(cert);
-    DANEerr(DANE_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    DANEerr(DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
     return 0;
     }
   }
@@ -429,13 +433,13 @@ EVP_PKEY *newkey = key ? key : X509_get_pubkey(subject);
 #define WRAP_MID 0              /* Ensure intermediate. */
 #define WRAP_TOP 1              /* Ensure self-signed. */
 
-if(!name || !newkey || !(cert = X509_new()))
+if (!name || !newkey || !(cert = X509_new()))
   return 0;
 
 /*
  * Record the depth of the trust-anchor certificate.
  */
-if(dane->depth < 0)
+if (dane->depth < 0)
   dane->depth = depth + 1;
 
 /*
@@ -454,27 +458,27 @@ akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(subject, NID_authority_key_identifier, 0, 0);
  *
  * CA cert valid for +/- 30 days
  */
-if(  !X509_set_version(cert, 2)
-  || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject)
-  || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name)
-  || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid)
-  || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L)
-  || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L)
-  || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey)
-  || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE")
-  || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid))
-  || !add_skid(cert, akid)
-  || (  !top && wrap_to_root
-     && !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP)))
+if (  !X509_set_version(cert, 2)
+   || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject)
+   || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name)
+   || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid)
+   || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L)
+   || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_get_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L)
+   || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey)
+   || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE")
+   || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid))
+   || !add_skid(cert, akid)
+   || (  !top && wrap_to_root
+      && !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP)))
   ret = 0;
 
-if(akid)
+if (akid)
   AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid);
-if(!key)
+if (!key)
   EVP_PKEY_free(newkey);
-if(ret)
+if (ret)
   ret = grow_chain(dane, !top && wrap_to_root ? UNTRUSTED : TRUSTED, cert);
-if(cert)
+if (cert)
   X509_free(cert);
 return ret;
 }
@@ -482,18 +486,18 @@ return ret;
 static int
 wrap_cert(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *tacert, int depth)
 {
-if(dane->depth < 0)
+if (dane->depth < 0)
   dane->depth = depth + 1;
 
 /*
  * If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly.
  * Otherwise, synthesize requisuite ancestors.
  */
-if(  !wrap_to_root
-  || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK)
+if (  !wrap_to_root
+   || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK)
   return grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, tacert);
 
-if(wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID))
+if (wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID))
   return grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, tacert);
 return 0;
 }
@@ -515,9 +519,9 @@ int done = 0;
  */
 for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next)
   {
-  if(X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK)
+  if (X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK)
     {
-    if(!(pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value)))
+    if (!(pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value)))
       {
       /*
        * The cert originally contained a valid pkey, which does
@@ -527,7 +531,7 @@ for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next)
       break;
       }
     /* Check signature, since some other TA may work if not this. */
-    if(X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0)
+    if (X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0)
       done = wrap_cert(dane, x->value, depth) ? 1 : -1;
     EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
     }
@@ -553,8 +557,8 @@ for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next)
  * This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is
  * not of the right type or length, throw these away,
  */
-for(k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next)
-  if(X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0)
+for (k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next)
+  if (X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0)
     done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1;
   else
     ERR_clear_error();
@@ -573,25 +577,25 @@ EVP_PKEY *takey;
 X509 *ca;
 STACK_OF(X509) *in = ctx->untrusted;        /* XXX: Accessor? */
 
-if(!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0))
+if (!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0))
   return -1;
 
 /*
  * Accept a degenerate case: depth 0 self-signed trust-anchor.
  */
-if(X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK)
+if (X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK)
   {
   dane->depth = 0;
-  matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], cert, 0);
-  if(matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert))
+  matched = match(dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA], cert, 0);
+  if (matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert))
     matched = -1;
   return matched;
   }
 
 /* Make a shallow copy of the input untrusted chain. */
-if(!(in = sk_X509_dup(in)))
+if (!(in = sk_X509_dup(in)))
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return -1;
   }
 
@@ -603,29 +607,29 @@ if(!(in = sk_X509_dup(in)))
  *
  * Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed.
  */
-for(n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth)
+for (n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth)
   {
-  for(i = 0; i < n; ++i)
-    if(X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK)
+  for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+    if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK)
       break;
 
   /*
    * Final untrusted element with no issuer in the peer's chain, it may
    * however be signed by a pkey or cert obtained via a TLSA RR.
    */
-  if(i == n)
+  if (i == n)
     break;
 
   /* Peer's chain contains an issuer ca. */
   ca = sk_X509_delete(in, i);
 
   /* If not a trust anchor, record untrusted ca and continue. */
-  if((matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA], ca, depth+1))
-     == 0)
+  if ((matched = match(dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA], ca,
+		     depth + 1)) == 0)
     {
-    if(grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca))
+    if (grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca))
       {
-      if(!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK)
+      if (!X509_check_issued(ca, ca) == X509_V_OK)
 	{
 	/* Restart with issuer as subject */
 	cert = ca;
@@ -644,13 +648,13 @@ for(n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth)
     }
   else if(matched == MATCHED_PKEY)
     {
-    if(  !(takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca))
-      || !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID))
+    if (  !(takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca))
+       || !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID))
       {
-      if(takey)
+      if (takey)
 	EVP_PKEY_free(takey);
       else
-	DANEerr(DANE_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	DANEerr(DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       matched = -1;
       }
     }
@@ -665,7 +669,7 @@ sk_X509_free(in);
  * no issuer in the chain, we check for a possible signature via a DNS
  * obtained TA cert or public key.
  */
-if(matched == 0 && cert)
+if (matched == 0 && cert)
   matched = ta_signed(dane, cert, depth);
 
 return matched;
@@ -676,19 +680,24 @@ check_end_entity(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert)
 {
 int matched;
 
-matched = match(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF], cert, 0);
-if(matched > 0)
+matched = match(dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE], cert, 0);
+if (matched > 0)
+  {
+  dane->mdpth = 0;
+  dane->match = cert;
+  X509_up_ref(cert);
   if(!ctx->chain)
     {
-    if(  (ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null())
-      && sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, cert))
-      CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    if (  (ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) != 0
+       && sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, cert))
+      X509_up_ref(cert);
     else
       {
-      DANEerr(DANE_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+      DANEerr(DANESSL_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
       return -1;
       }
     }
+  }
 return matched;
 }
 
@@ -698,7 +707,7 @@ match_name(const char *certid, ssl_dane *dane)
 int multi = dane->multi;
 dane_host_list hosts;
 
-for(hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
+for (hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
   {
   int match_subdomain = 0;
   const char *domain = hosts->value;
@@ -706,7 +715,7 @@ for(hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
   int idlen;
   int domlen;
 
-  if(*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0')
+  if (*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0')
     {
     ++domain;
     match_subdomain = 1;
@@ -717,9 +726,9 @@ for(hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
    */
   if(match_subdomain)
     {
-    if(  (idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1
-      && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.'
-      && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain))
+    if (  (idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1
+       && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.'
+       && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain))
       return 1;
     else
       continue;
@@ -730,11 +739,11 @@ for(hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next)
    * matches one (if multi is false) or more hostname components under
    * the condition that the certid contains multiple hostname components.
    */
-  if(  !strcasecmp(certid, domain)
-    || (  certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0
-       && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0
-       && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent))
-       && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, certid+1) == 0))
+  if (  !strcasecmp(certid, domain)
+     || (  certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0
+        && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0
+        && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent))
+        && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, certid+1) == 0))
     return 1;
   }
 return 0;
@@ -745,11 +754,11 @@ check_name(char *name, int len)
 {
 char *cp = name + len;
 
-while(len > 0 && !*--cp)
+while (len > 0 && !*--cp)
   --len;                          /* Ignore trailing NULs */
-if(len <= 0)
+if (len <= 0)
   return 0;
-for(cp = name; *cp; cp++)
+for (cp = name; *cp; cp++)
   {
   char c = *cp;
   if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
@@ -759,7 +768,7 @@ for(cp = name; *cp; cp++)
 	(c == '*')))
     return 0;                   /* Only LDH, '.' and '*' */
   }
-if(cp - name != len)               /* Guard against internal NULs */
+if (cp - name != len)               /* Guard against internal NULs */
   return 0;
 return name;
 }
@@ -767,9 +776,9 @@ return name;
 static char *
 parse_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME *gn)
 {
-if(gn->type != GEN_DNS)
+if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
   return 0;
-if(ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
+if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING)
   return 0;
 return check_name((char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5),
 		  ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5));
@@ -786,16 +795,16 @@ int nid = NID_commonName;
 int len;
 int i;
 
-if(!name || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0)
+if (!name || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0)
   return 0;
-if(!(entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i)))
+if (!(entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i)))
   return 0;
-if(!(entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)))
+if (!(entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry)))
   return 0;
 
-if((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0)
+if ((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0)
   return 0;
-if(len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0)
+if (len <= 0 || check_name((char *) namebuf, len) == 0)
   {
   OPENSSL_free(namebuf);
   return 0;
@@ -811,25 +820,25 @@ BOOL got_altname = FALSE;
 GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
 
 gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0);
-if(gens)
+if (gens)
   {
   int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
   int i;
 
-  for(i = 0; i < n; ++i)
+  for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
     {
     const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
     const char *certid;
 
-    if(gn->type != GEN_DNS)
+    if (gn->type != GEN_DNS)
 	continue;
     got_altname = TRUE;
     certid = parse_dns_name(gn);
-    if(certid && *certid)
+    if (certid && *certid)
       {
-      if((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0)
+      if ((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0)
 	continue;
-      if(!(dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid)))
+      if (!(dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid)))
 	matched = -1;
       break;
       }
@@ -841,11 +850,14 @@ if(gens)
  * XXX: Should the subjectName be skipped when *any* altnames are present,
  * or only when DNS altnames are present?
  */
-if(got_altname)
+if (got_altname == 0)
   {
   char *certid = parse_subject_name(cert);
-  if(certid != 0 && *certid && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0)
-    dane->mhost = certid;       /* Already a copy */
+  if (certid != 0 && *certid
+    && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0)
+    dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid);
+    if (certid)
+      OPENSSL_free(certid);
   }
 return matched;
 }
@@ -865,85 +877,119 @@ int chain_length = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane verify-chain\n");
 
-issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_ISSUER];
-leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_LEAF];
+issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_PKIX_TA];
+leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_PKIX_EE];
 ctx->verify = dane->verify;
 
-if((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0)
+if ((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0)
   {
   X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
   return 0;
   }
 
-if(!matched)
+if (!matched)
   {
   ctx->error_depth = 0;
   ctx->current_cert = cert;
   X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH);
-  if(!cb(0, ctx))
+  if (!cb(0, ctx))
     return 0;
   }
 matched = 0;
 
-/*
- * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already
- * matched a usage 2 trust anchor.
- *
- * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not
- * self-issued.  This should be fixed in a future OpenSSL.
- */
-if(dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots))
-  {
-#ifndef NO_CALLBACK_WORKAROUND
-  X509 *top = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, dane->depth);
+    /*
+     * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already
+     * matched a usage 2 trust anchor.
+     *
+     * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not
+     * self-issued.  This should be fixed in a future OpenSSL.
+     */
+    if (dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots))
+      {
+      X509 *top = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, dane->depth);
 
-  if(X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK)
-    {
-    ctx->error_depth = dane->depth;
-    ctx->current_cert = top;
-    if(!cb(1, ctx))
-      return 0;
-    }
+      dane->mdpth = dane->depth;
+      dane->match = top;
+      X509_up_ref(top);
+
+#ifndef NO_CALLBACK_WORKAROUND
+      if (X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK)
+	{
+        ctx->error_depth = dane->depth;
+        ctx->current_cert = top;
+        if (!cb(1, ctx))
+          return 0;
+        }
 #endif
   /* Pop synthetic trust-anchor ancestors off the chain! */
   while (--chain_length > dane->depth)
       X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
   }
-else if(issuer_rrs || leaf_rrs)
+else
   {
-  int n = chain_length;
+  int n = 0;
+  X509 *xn = cert;
 
   /*
    * Check for an EE match, then a CA match at depths > 0, and
    * finally, if the EE cert is self-issued, for a depth 0 CA match.
    */
-  if(leaf_rrs)
-    matched = match(leaf_rrs, cert, 0);
-  while(!matched && issuer_rrs && --n >= 0)
-    {
-    X509 *xn = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+  if (leaf_rrs)
+    matched = match(leaf_rrs, xn, 0);
+    if (issuer_rrs)
+      {
+      for (n = chain_length-1; !matched && n >= 0; --n)
+	{
+	xn = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
+	if (n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK)
+	  matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n);
+	}
+      }
 
-    if(n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK)
-      matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n);
+    if (!matched)
+      {
+      ctx->current_cert = cert;
+      ctx->error_depth = 0;
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED);
+      if (!cb(0, ctx))
+	return 0;
+      }
+    else
+      {
+      dane->mdpth = n;
+      dane->match = xn;
+      X509_up_ref(xn);
+      }
     }
 
-  if(matched < 0)
-    {
-    X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
-    return 0;
-    }
+return ctx->verify(ctx);
+}
 
-  if(!matched)
-    {
-    ctx->current_cert = cert;
-    ctx->error_depth = 0;
-    X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED);
-    if(!cb(0, ctx))
-      return 0;
-    }
+static void
+dane_reset(ssl_dane *dane)
+{
+dane->depth = -1;
+if (dane->mhost)
+  {
+  OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost);
+  dane->mhost = 0;
   }
-
-return ctx->verify(ctx);
+if (dane->roots)
+  {
+  sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free);
+  dane->roots = 0;
+  }
+if (dane->chain)
+  {
+  sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free);
+  dane->chain = 0;
+  }
+if (dane->match)
+  {
+  X509_free(dane->match);
+  dane->match = 0;
+  }
+dane->mdpth = -1;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -958,61 +1004,82 @@ X509 *cert = ctx->cert;             /* XXX: accessor? */
 
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane verify-cert\n");
 
-if(ssl_idx < 0)
+if (ssl_idx < 0)
   ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx();
-if(dane_idx < 0)
+if (dane_idx < 0)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return -1;
   }
 
 ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx);
-if(!(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) || !cert)
+if (!(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) || !cert)
   return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
 
-if(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF])
+    /* Reset for verification of a new chain, perhaps a renegotiation. */
+dane_reset(dane);
+
+if (dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE])
   {
-  if((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0)
+  if ((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0)
     {
     ctx->error_depth = 0;
     ctx->current_cert = cert;
     return cb(1, ctx);
     }
-  if(matched < 0)
+  if (matched < 0)
     {
     X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
     return -1;
     }
   }
 
-if(dane->selectors[SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA])
-  {
-  if((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0)
-    {
-    X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
-    return -1;
-    }
-  if(matched)
+  if (dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA])
     {
-    /*
-     * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected
-     * structure member at the expected offset.
-     */
-    X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots);
-    X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain);
-    OPENSSL_assert(ctx->untrusted == dane->chain);
+    if ((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0)
+      {
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM);
+      return -1;
+      }
+    if (matched)
+      {
+      /*
+       * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected
+       * structure member at the expected offset.
+       */
+      X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots);
+      X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain);
+      OPENSSL_assert(ctx->untrusted == dane->chain);
+      }
     }
-  }
 
-/*
- * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until
- * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain()
- * wrapper.
- */
-dane->verify = ctx->verify;
-ctx->verify = verify_chain;
+  /*
+   * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until
+   * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain()
+   * wrapper.
+   */
+  dane->verify = ctx->verify;
+  ctx->verify = verify_chain;
+
+  if (X509_verify_cert(ctx))
+    return 1;
 
-return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+  /*
+   * If the chain is invalid, clear any matching cert or hostname, to
+   * protect callers that might erroneously rely on these alone without
+   * checking the validation status.
+   */
+  if (dane->match)
+    {
+    X509_free(dane->match);
+    dane->match = 0;
+    }
+  if (dane->mhost)
+    {
+    OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost);
+    dane->mhost = 0;
+    }
+   return 0;
 }
 
 static dane_list
@@ -1021,15 +1088,15 @@ list_alloc(size_t vsize)
 void *value = (void *) OPENSSL_malloc(vsize);
 dane_list l;
 
-if(!value)
+if (!value)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return 0;
   }
-if(!(l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l))))
+if (!(l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l))))
   {
   OPENSSL_free(value);
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return 0;
   }
 l->next = 0;
@@ -1043,7 +1110,7 @@ list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *))
 dane_list head;
 dane_list next;
 
-for(head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next)
+for (head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next)
   {
   next = head->next;
   if (f && head->value)
@@ -1055,7 +1122,7 @@ for(head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next)
 static void
 dane_mtype_free(void *p)
 {
-list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, OPENSSL_freeFunc);
+list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, CRYPTO_free);
 OPENSSL_free(p);
 }
 
@@ -1090,25 +1157,20 @@ int u;
 
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane lib-cleanup\n");
 
-if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)))
+if (dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)))
   return;
 (void) SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, 0);
 
-if(dane->hosts)
-  list_free(dane->hosts, OPENSSL_freeFunc);
-if(dane->mhost)
-  OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost);
-for(u = 0; u <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++u)
-  if(dane->selectors[u])
+dane_reset(dane);
+if (dane->hosts)
+  list_free(dane->hosts, CRYPTO_free);
+for (u = 0; u <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++u)
+  if (dane->selectors[u])
     list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free);
-if(dane->pkeys)
+if (dane->pkeys)
   list_free(dane->pkeys, pkey_free);
-if(dane->certs)
+if (dane->certs)
   list_free(dane->certs, cert_free);
-if(dane->roots)
-  sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free);
-if(dane->chain)
-  sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free);
 OPENSSL_free(dane);
 }
 
@@ -1117,12 +1179,12 @@ host_list_init(const char **src)
 {
 dane_host_list head = NULL;
 
-while(*src)
+while (*src)
   {
   dane_host_list elem = (dane_host_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*elem));
-  if(!elem)
+  if (elem == 0)
     {
-    list_free(head, OPENSSL_freeFunc);
+    list_free(head, CRYPTO_free);
     return 0;
     }
   elem->value = OPENSSL_strdup(*src++);
@@ -1132,6 +1194,65 @@ return head;
 }
 
 
+int
+DANESSL_get_match_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 **match, const char **mhost, int *depth)
+{
+ssl_dane *dane;
+
+if (dane_idx < 0 || (dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0)
+  {
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_INIT);
+  return -1;
+  }
+
+if (dane->match)
+  {
+  if (match)
+    *match = dane->match;
+  if (mhost)
+    *mhost = dane->mhost;
+  if (depth)
+    *depth = dane->mdpth;
+  }
+
+  return (dane->match != 0);
+}
+
+
+#ifdef never_called
+int
+DANESSL_verify_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+int ret;
+X509 *cert;
+X509_STORE_CTX store_ctx;
+SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
+X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx);
+int store_ctx_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx();
+
+cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&store_ctx, store, cert, chain))
+  return 0;
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&store_ctx, store_ctx_idx, ssl);
+
+X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&store_ctx,
+            SSL_is_server(ssl) ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&store_ctx),
+            SSL_get0_param(ssl));
+
+if (SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl))
+  X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&store_ctx, SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl));
+
+ret = verify_cert(&store_ctx, NULL);
+
+SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&store_ctx));
+X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&store_ctx);
+
+return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+
 
 
 /*
@@ -1170,121 +1291,139 @@ DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane add-tlsa: usage %u sel %u mdname \"%s\"\n",
 
 if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)))
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_DANE_INIT);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_INIT);
   return -1;
   }
 
-if(usage > SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST)
+if (usage > DANESSL_USAGE_LAST)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_USAGE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_USAGE);
   return 0;
   }
-if(selector > SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_LAST)
+if (selector > DANESSL_SELECTOR_LAST)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
-  return 0;
-  }
-if(mdname && !(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname)))
-  {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DIGEST);
-  return 0;
-  }
-if(!data)
-  {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_NULL_DATA);
-  return 0;
-  }
-if(mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md))
-  {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
   return 0;
   }
 
-if(!mdname)
-  {
-  X509 *x = 0;
-  EVP_PKEY *k = 0;
-  const unsigned char *p = data;
+    /* Support built-in standard one-digit mtypes */
+  if (mdname && *mdname && mdname[1] == '\0')
+    switch (*mdname - '0')
+    {
+    case DANESSL_MATCHING_FULL: mdname = 0;	   break;
+    case DANESSL_MATCHING_2256: mdname = "sha256"; break;
+    case DANESSL_MATCHING_2512: mdname = "sha512"; break;
+    }
+  if (mdname && *mdname && (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname)) == 0)
+    {
+    DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST);
+    return 0;
+    }
+  if (mdname && *mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md))
+    {
+    DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
+    return 0;
+    }
+  if (!data)
+    {
+    DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA);
+    return 0;
+    }
+
+  /*
+   * Full Certificate or Public Key when NULL or empty digest name
+   */
+  if (!mdname || !*mdname)
+    {
+    X509 *x = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *k = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p = data;
 
 #define xklistinit(lvar, ltype, var, freeFunc) do { \
-      (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \
-      if (!(lvar)) { \
-	  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \
-	  freeFunc((var)); \
-	  return 0; \
-      } \
-      (lvar)->next = 0; \
-      lvar->value = var; \
-  } while (0)
+	  (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \
+	  if ((lvar) == 0) { \
+	      DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \
+	      freeFunc((var)); \
+	      return 0; \
+	  } \
+	  (lvar)->next = 0; \
+	  lvar->value = var; \
+      } while (0)
 #define xkfreeret(ret) do { \
-      if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \
-      if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \
-      return (ret); \
-  } while (0)
+	  if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \
+	  if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \
+	  return (ret); \
+      } while (0)
 
-  switch(selector)
+  switch (selector)
     {
-    case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT:
-      if(!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data)
+    case DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT:
+      if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data)
 	{
 	if (x)
-	    X509_free(x);
-	DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT);
+	  X509_free(x);
+	DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT);
 	return 0;
 	}
       k = X509_get_pubkey(x);
       EVP_PKEY_free(k);
-      if(!k)
+      if (k == 0)
 	{
 	X509_free(x);
-	DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY);
+	DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY);
 	return 0;
 	}
-      if(usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA)
+      if (usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA)
 	xklistinit(xlist, dane_cert_list, x, X509_free);
       break;
 
-    case SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI:
-      if(!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data)
+    case DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+      if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data)
 	{
-	if(k)
+	if (k)
 	  EVP_PKEY_free(k);
-	DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_ADD_TLSA, DANE_R_BAD_PKEY);
-	return 0;
+      DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_PKEY);
+      return 0;
 	}
-      if(usage == SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA)
+      if (usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA)
 	xklistinit(klist, dane_pkey_list, k, EVP_PKEY_free);
       break;
     }
   }
 
 /* Find insertion point and don't add duplicate elements. */
-for(s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next)
-  if(s->value->selector == selector)
-    for(m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next)
-      if(m->value->md == md)
-	for(d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next)
-	  if(  d->value->datalen == dlen
-	    && memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0)
+for (s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next)
+  if (s->value->selector == selector)
+    {
+    for (m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next)
+      if (m->value->md == md)
+	{
+	for (d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next)
+	  if (  d->value->datalen == dlen
+	     && memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0)
 	    xkfreeret(1);
+	break;
+	}
+    break;
+    }
 
-if(!(d = (dane_data_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen)))
+if ((d = (dane_data_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen)) == 0)
   xkfreeret(0);
 d->value->datalen = dlen;
 memcpy(d->value->data, data, dlen);
-if(!m)
+if (!m)
   {
-  if(!(m = (dane_mtype_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value))))
+  if ((m = (dane_mtype_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value))) == 0)
     {
-    list_free(d, OPENSSL_freeFunc);
+    list_free(d, CRYPTO_free);
     xkfreeret(0);
     }
   m->value->data = 0;
-  if((m->value->md = md) != 0)
+  if ((m->value->md = md) != 0)
     m->value->mdlen = dlen;
-  if(!s)
+  if (!s)
     {
-    if(!(s = (dane_selector_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value))))
+    if ((s = (dane_selector_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value))) == 0)
       {
       list_free(m, dane_mtype_free);
       xkfreeret(0);
@@ -1297,9 +1436,9 @@ if(!m)
   }
 LINSERT(m->value->data, d);
 
-if(xlist)
+if (xlist)
   LINSERT(dane->certs, xlist);
-else if(klist)
+else if (klist)
   LINSERT(dane->pkeys, klist);
 ++dane->count;
 return 1;
@@ -1334,35 +1473,25 @@ DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames)
 {
 ssl_dane *dane;
 int i;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_INTERNAL
-SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl);
 
-
-if(sctx->app_verify_callback != verify_cert)
-  {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_SCTX_INIT);
-  return -1;
-  }
-#else
-DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ssl-init\n");
-if(dane_idx < 0)
+DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ssl_init\n");
+if (dane_idx < 0)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT);
   return -1;
   }
-#endif
 
-if(sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain))
-    return 0;
+if (sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain))
+  return 0;
 
-if(!(dane = (ssl_dane *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ssl_dane))))
+if ((dane = (ssl_dane *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ssl_dane))) == 0)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   return 0;
   }
-if(!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane))
+if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane))
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   OPENSSL_free(dane);
   return 0;
   }
@@ -1373,18 +1502,21 @@ dane->thost = 0;
 dane->pkeys = 0;
 dane->certs = 0;
 dane->chain = 0;
+dane->match = 0;
 dane->roots = 0;
 dane->depth = -1;
-dane->mhost = 0;                    /* Future SSL control interface */
-dane->multi = 0;                    /* Future SSL control interface */
+dane->mhost = 0;			/* Future SSL control interface */
+dane->mdpth = 0;			/* Future SSL control interface */
+dane->multi = 0;			/* Future SSL control interface */
 dane->count = 0;
+dane->hosts = 0;
 
-for(i = 0; i <= SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST; ++i)
-    dane->selectors[i] = 0;
+for (i = 0; i <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++i)
+  dane->selectors[i] = 0;
 
-if(hostnames && !(dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames)))
+if (hostnames && (dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames)) == 0)
   {
-  DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+  DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
   DANESSL_cleanup(ssl);
   return 0;
   }
@@ -1415,12 +1547,12 @@ int
 DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 {
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ctx-init\n");
-if(dane_idx >= 0)
+if (dane_idx >= 0)
   {
   SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, verify_cert, 0);
   return 1;
   }
-DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_CTX_DANE_INIT, DANE_R_LIBRARY_INIT);
+DANEerr(DANESSL_F_CTX_INIT, DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT);
 return -1;
 }
 
@@ -1430,15 +1562,15 @@ init_once(volatile int *value, int (*init)(void), void (*postinit)(void))
 int wlock = 0;
 
 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-if(*value < 0)
+if (*value < 0)
   {
   CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
   CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
   wlock = 1;
-  if(*value < 0)
+  if (*value < 0)
     {
     *value = init();
-    if(postinit)
+    if (postinit)
       postinit();
     }
   }
@@ -1466,12 +1598,12 @@ ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_reasons);
  * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered.
  */
 #if defined(LN_sha256) && defined(NID_sha256) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
-if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
-if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
+if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
+if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
 #endif
 #if defined(LN_sha512) && defined(NID_sha512) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512)
-if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
-if(!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
+if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
+if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
 #endif
 
 /*
@@ -1501,16 +1633,15 @@ int
 DANESSL_library_init(void)
 {
 DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane lib-init\n");
-if(err_lib_dane < 0)
+if (err_lib_dane < 0)
   init_once(&err_lib_dane, ERR_get_next_error_library, dane_init);
 
 #if defined(LN_sha256)
 /* No DANE without SHA256 support */
-if(dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0)
+if (dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0)
   return 1;
 #endif
-
-DANEerr(DANE_F_SSL_DANE_LIBRARY_INIT, DANE_R_DANE_SUPPORT);
+DANEerr(DANESSL_F_LIBRARY_INIT, DANESSL_R_SUPPORT);
 return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/src/src/danessl.h b/src/src/danessl.h
index 5b1584da2..1d6439e2f 100644
--- a/src/src/danessl.h
+++ b/src/src/danessl.h
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
-#ifndef HEADER_SSL_DANE_H
-#define HEADER_SSL_DANE_H
+/*
+ *  Author: Viktor Dukhovni
+ *  License: THIS CODE IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
+ */
+#ifndef HEADER_DANESSL_H
+#define HEADER_DANESSL_H
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
@@ -8,24 +12,36 @@
  * Certificate usages:
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.1
  */
-#define SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_ISSUER     0
-#define SSL_DANE_USAGE_LIMIT_LEAF       1
-#define SSL_DANE_USAGE_TRUSTED_CA       2
-#define SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF       3
-#define SSL_DANE_USAGE_LAST             SSL_DANE_USAGE_FIXED_LEAF
+#define DANESSL_USAGE_PKIX_TA	0
+#define DANESSL_USAGE_PKIX_EE	1
+#define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA	2
+#define DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE	3
+#define DANESSL_USAGE_LAST		DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE
 
 /*-
  * Selectors:
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.2
  */
-#define SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_CERT          0
-#define SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI          1
-#define SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_LAST          SSL_DANE_SELECTOR_SPKI
+#define DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT		0
+#define DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI		1
+#define DANESSL_SELECTOR_LAST		DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI
+
+/*-
+ * Matching types:
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698#section-2.1.3
+ */
+#define DANESSL_MATCHING_FULL		0
+#define DANESSL_MATCHING_2256		1
+#define DANESSL_MATCHING_2512		2
+#define DANESSL_MATCHING_LAST		DANESSL_MATCHING_2512
 
 extern int DANESSL_library_init(void);
 extern int DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *);
 extern int DANESSL_init(SSL *, const char *, const char **);
 extern void DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *);
 extern int DANESSL_add_tlsa(SSL *, uint8_t, uint8_t, const char *,
-                            unsigned const char *, size_t);
+			    unsigned const char *, size_t);
+extern int DANESSL_get_match_cert(SSL *, X509 **, const char **, int *);
+extern int DANESSL_verify_chain(SSL *, STACK_OF(X509) *);
+
 #endif
diff --git a/src/src/tls-openssl.c b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
index 3430e4eac..49347a2ae 100644
--- a/src/src/tls-openssl.c
+++ b/src/src/tls-openssl.c
@@ -294,6 +294,7 @@ X509 * old_cert;
 ev = tlsp == &tls_out ? client_static_cbinfo->event_action : event_action;
 if (ev)
   {
+  DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("verify_event: %s %d\n", what, depth);
   old_cert = tlsp->peercert;
   tlsp->peercert = X509_dup(cert);
   /* NB we do not bother setting peerdn */